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J. R. DANIELSON

Finland's Union

With

The Russian Empire



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Helsingfors, Septembre 1891



FINLAND'S UNION
WITH
THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

WITH REFERENCE TO
M. K. ORDIN'S WORK „FINLAND'S SUBJUGATION“.

BY
Dr J. RICH. DANIELSON.
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HELSINGFORS.



TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD SWEDISH EDITION.

BORGÅ,
WERNER SÖDERSTRÖM.

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1891.

I. INTRODUCTION.

IN the year 1887 M. K. Ordin, now a Steward of the Household at the Imperial Court of Russia, appeared before the Russian public with the translation of a work entitled „Précis du droit public du Grand Duché de Finlande“, by Senator Mechelin, formerly Professor of public law at the University of Helsingfors. M. Ordin did not limit his task to that of a mere translator, for he added notes to the original text, which tended to prove, that M. Mechelin, though he distinctly rendered Finnish notions and opinions, systematically ignored the rights of Russia. These remarks were almost exclusively directed against the historical sketch with which the Finnish author begins his work. According to the latter Finland's position as a State, — and therefore the mode of her union with Russia — rests principally on the solemn act, which took place on March $\frac{1}{2}$ in the year 1809 in Borgo cathedral. The Emperor Alexander I, himself present, caused to be read and delivered to the assembled Estates of Finland an Assurance, signed two days before, that the country was to retain its Protestant religion and its fundamental laws inviolate. The Estates took the oath of allegiance, declar-

ing the Emperor Grand Duke of Finland, and also swore to maintain the Constitution. M. Ordin, on the other hand, in the notes which accompany his translation, tries to make out that the act in Borgo was of a moral nature only; that the Emperor had not, in his declaration, made any binding promise, either for himself or his successors. It was not, according to M. Ordin's opinion, by means of some documents from the Diet at Borgo that Finland's relation to the Empire was determined. This was effected by the treaty of Fredrikshamn on Sept. 17, 1809 whereby peace was concluded and the King of Sweden renounced to the Emperor all his rights to Finland. According to M. Mechelin the Grand Duchy of Finland, although inseparably united with Russia, forms a State, with a Constitution guaranteed for all time by the Emperor. According to M. Ordin it is a Russian province, pure and simple, where, as is the case in other parts of the Empire, all power rests with the Russian Government.

The painful sensation M. Ordin's work naturally caused in Finland was enhanced by the conduct of the Russian press. No one was surprised that newspapers such as the „*Novoe Vremya*“, which had always maintained a position of animosity towards Finland, greeted the new historic-political expositions with delight. But even organs that had hitherto manifested quite a different spirit, immediately after M. Ordin's translation had been published, and without awaiting a reply from the Finnish side, hurried to

agree with M. Ordin's notes and to deprive the Emperor Alexander I's declaration of every constitutional significance. Such being the case, people in Finland asked themselves not without some uneasiness, whether M. Ordin was not possibly a tool in the hands of others and whether his polemical notes were not to be considered as harbingers boding a general attack. The sympathy with which he met, showed that there was a considerable element in the Russian community desiring the destruction of the laws and institutions, which, not only Alexander I, but all his successors, had solemnly confirmed and under the protection of which Finland had enjoyed a period of four score years of material and intellectual progress.

The controversy, which now arose and was continued during the winter and spring of 1888, was from the Finnish side carried on principally by the Helsingfors newspapers. Senator Mechelin met M. Ordin's remarks in an article which appeared in the periodical „Vestnik Evropy“ (the European Messenger). M. Ordin replied in the „Novoe Vremya“ and in the „Rusky Vestnik“ (the Russian Messenger). What his ultimate intentions and those of his adherents were, was now made quite clear. In his article in the „Rusky Vestnik“ (for May 1888) M. Ordin calls the above mentioned declaration of the Emperor „a phrase suitable for the circumstances and the occasion“ and declares openly, that there exists no legal objection

whatever against depriving Finland of the rights that had been granted her.

Before the publication of M. Ordin's translation the author of the present work had consulted the Russian and Finnish archives concerning the relations between Russia and Finland during the period 1721—1809, and especially concerning the final settlement which took place in 1809¹. In consequence we felt inclined immediately to meet M. Ordin's attack, but there were circumstances which made it seem advisable to wait.

To begin with, M. Mechelin's answer in the „*Vestnik Evropy*“ was such that the question ought to have been made quite clear to an impartial reader. Secondly, M. Ordin had — and this it was that decided us to wait — expressed a wish that his Finnish opponents should keep silence until the publication of the detailed exposition of Finland's subjugation he professed to be working at. But he did not consider himself bound to exercise the forbearance he asked

¹ As a result of these studies appeared in the beginning of the year 1888 our work: „*Die Nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746—1751. Mit einer Darstellung russisch-schwedisch-finnischer Beziehungen 1740—1743. Von Joh. Rich. Danielson. Helsingfors*“. In a series of articles in the Finnish periodical *Valvoja* we had previously treated the question on the different opinions, concerning Finland's future political position which in 1808 existed at the Russian court and in an address at a meeting of the „*Finnish historical Society*“, we had also given an account of the separate propositions, which finally, in 1809, led to the organisation of a separate government for Finland.

from his adversaries. After the controversy had ceased in the spring of 1888, he again, in December, published an article where he tried to prove that § 4 of the fundamental laws of Russia, which runs as follows: „From the Imperial Russian throne are inseparable the thrones of the kingdom of Poland and of the Grand Duchy of Finland“, originated in a blunder, because there had never been erected a Finnish throne, either by a Swedish or a Russian monarch. These continuous attacks removed every cause for silence and resulted in the appearance of our article: „The Emperor Alexander I and Finland's political position“¹. The principal points of M. Ordin's declarations being repeated and met in this article it may not be out of the way to give a short statement of its contents as an explanatory introduction to the following.

In his polemical notes M. Ordin had several times made the assertion that the decrees and documents from 1808 and 1809 which were, in Finland, published in the Swedish language, and on which the Finnish authors generally base their exposition, in important particulars deviate from the Russian (and we may add the French) original acts, signed by the Emperor. He tries to make out that these differences

¹ Published in the „Valvoja“ Jan. 1889 — reproduced by the daily papers in Helsingfors.

have been fraught with fatal consequences, because „they have grown, in 75 years, into a large tree, bearing plenty of fruit, sweet to the taste for Finland, but very bitter for Russia“. In other words, M. Ordin considers Finland's position as a State to be an outcome of a series of mistakes, committed in the translation of documents — whether these mistakes be accidental or intentional he does not venture to say.

Now, what do these original acts contain? M. Ordin says that they never mention Finland as a State, but only as a province. The word „State“, he declares, is not to be found in any of these documents, but by continually and systematically repeating this expression, the Finnish authors have succeeded in making many people believe Finland to be a separate State ¹.

Refuting this accusation we referred to the propositions, which the Emperor had delivered to the Estates and also to the Regulations for His Majesty's Governing Council in the Grand Duchy of Finland, given at Peterhof on August 1st, 1809. In the original French text of these documents the word „State“ occurs several times in reference to Finland. The Emperor declares, for instance, in the introduction to the Regulations „Parmi les moyens d'assurer la prospérité de la Finlande, l'établissement d'une administra-

¹ M. Ordin's translation of Mechelin's „Précis du droit public“, p. 15.

tion générale Nous a paru d'une nécessité urgente. Il importoit au bien-être *de l'Etat* que les administrations provinciales eussent un point central, un tribunal suprême qui pût les diriger" The Emperor here makes a distinction between its provinces and Finland as a whole, which he calls „a State“.

Another of M. Ordin's chief arguments is, that in the declaration of the Emperor Alexander I to all the inhabitants of Finland, issued in Borgo on March $\frac{1}{2}$ ⁵, the word Constitution in the Swedish text occurs in the singular, whereas it is in the Russian text used in the plural. This difference is, according to his opinion, of great importance, because the word, used in the singular, means the political organisation of a State, but in the plural it is simply equivalent to statutes and regulations¹. In reply to this remark we quoted the official expressions of the Emperor, referring to the same document, in which the word Constitution is used in the singular.

On the ceremonial for the solemn act in Borgo, when the Estates took the oath of allegiance, the following words were written: „Approuvé par S. M. l'Empereur le 22 Fevrier, 1809, Secretaire d'état Speranski. We give § 7 of this ceremonial in full: „Après quoi le Gouverneur-Général déclarera que Sa Majesté Impériale a daigné confirmer solennellement *la Constitution de la Finlande*, en la sanctionnant de Sa signa-

¹ „Novoe Vremya“ Jan. 1^o 1888.

ture: il lira à haute voix l'Acte de confirmation et le remettra au Maréchal de la Noblesse“.

At the opening of the Diet on March 14th the Emperor caused the propositions he submitted to the Estates to be read. The introduction which precedes them begins: „Sa Majesté Impériale en réunissant les états de Finlande en une Diète générale a bien voulu donner par là une preuve solennelle de Ses intentions généreuses de conserver et maintenir inviolablement la religion, les loix, la *Constitution du pays*, les droits et privilèges de tous les états en général et de chaque citoyen en particulier“.

We possess another declaration, if possible still more solemn than the one just mentioned, of the Emperor's intention to confirm and sanction the Constitution of Finland. In the French speech with which he opened the Diet — for the first time published in our article — he says: „*J'ai promis de maintenir votre Constitution, vos loix fondamentales, votre réunion ici vous garantit Ma promesse*“. With these words „I have promised to maintain your Constitution“ the Emperor evidently refers to the declaration which he had signed the day before, but which, according to the ceremonial, was not to be read by the Governor-General till the day after. It is in this same document that the word Constitution occurs in the singular, a „blunder“ which, according to M. Ordin, has most fatally influenced the political relations between Finland and Russia.

Hence this so called blunder by no means changed the import of the declaration, the Swedish translation giving a clear and distinct expression to the monarch's intentions.

In replying to the question concerning the throne of Finland, the existence of which M. Ordin denies, we referred to the above quoted passages. The throne is naturally, when mentioned by law, a figure of speech. By recognising Finland as a State, and by confirming the Constitution this country had possessed in common with Sweden, the Emperor Alexander had created a Finnish throne. But he had also erected it in an external, visible way. In the ceremonial, which the Emperor had signed, we read: „Sa Majesté Impériale, assis sur le trône“, etc. etc. From the description of his countryman, Prince Gagarin „Les treize journées, ou la Finlande“ M. Ordin might have learnt, that to the throne was attached the coat of arms of Finland.

From the throne of Finland, erected in the Temple of the Most High, the Emperor had spoken to the Estates of Finland, from this throne he had received their oath of allegiance and had his declaration read to maintain the laws of the Finnish people and all their rights. In the face of all this, how is it possible to proclaim that the Finnish throne does not exist? How is it possible to maintain that the documents do not mention it? And is it possible to believe as M. Ordin boldly avers, that § 4 of the

Russian fundamental law rests on an error in translation.

The main object of our polemical article was to prove that the Emperor Alexander, at the time when he laid the foundation of Finland's present political situation, expounded this situation in words, which, when they are used by the Finns M. Ordin declares to be mistakes and forgeries. We had therefore quoted documents almost exclusively from the year 1809, with the exception only of two statutes from 1810 and 1816 wherein the Emperor gives an authentic explanation of the motives which ruled his actions in his dealings with Finland.

The manifesto of March 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1810 opens thus: „Du moment que la Providence Nous a remis le sort de la Finlande, Nous résolûmes de gouverner ce pays comme une nation libre et jouissant des droits que sa constitution lui garantit“.

In the notification of Feb. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1816 — written in Russian — the Emperor, after his return from the war against the French, issued a command that the Governing Council for Finland was to be called by the same name, given to those of Russia and Poland i. e. Senate. We quote one passage: „Assured that the Constitution (Конституция) and the laws which, adapted to the customs, education and spirit of the Finnish people from distant times, formed the basis of its civic liberty and organisation, could not without risk be limited or changed, We on assuming the sove-

reignty over this country, have not only in the most solemn manner confirmed the Constitution and the laws appertaining to it and on the foundation of these to every Finnish citizen his special rights and prerogatives, but We have also - - - ". „- - - We have deigned to confirm for all time the promise given by Us concerning the preservation of a separate Constitution (Конституция) to this country under Our Sceptre and that of our Heirs". After the Emperor had given the Governing Council the title of Senate for Finland, he declared that „there was to be no change, however, in its actual composition and still less in the Constitution (Конституция) and laws by Us ratified for Finland and herewith ratified anew in all respects".

In this decree then, of February 21, 1816 the Emperor again, in the most solemn and binding manner, not only in his own name, but in that of his successors sanctioned and confirmed Finland's autonomic position, her separate government, her Constitution. Even though this document were the only one in existence wherein the Russian Monarchs had sworn to maintain Finland's laws, the position of this country as a separate State would be quite safe according to law. In reference to these laws the Emperor uses the word Constitution four times and always in the singular.

Such is the quality and value of M. Ordin's assertions.

M. Ordin, not being able to explain away these authentic documents, attempted to coolly ignore our remarks. He certainly published a sort of rejoinder to the protests that had been raised in Finland against his denial of the existence of a Finnish throne, but he never with a word mentioned the facts we had pointed out. As far as we know, this article was the last, treating of questions concerning Finland, that M. Ordin for some time published in his own name. But part of the Russian press, now with the „Moskowskia Vedomosti“ (the Moscow Gazette) at their head continued the warfare they had begun. The most insolent falsehoods appeared continually in these papers. Nearly every day, or at least every week, there were articles accusing the government officers of being wanting in University education¹ or treating of continual attempts, said to have been going on for scores of years, on the part of the Finns to possess themselves of advantages at the cost of Russia. Several of these were publicly ascribed to M. Ordin, without his thinking it worth his while to protest against the honour of being a lampoon writer thus awarded him. The mischief went so far that the Governor-General of Finland at last considered himself in duty bound to insert a denial of the statements in the „Moscow Gazette“ in a report to His Ma-

¹ In Finland almost every Government officer must have passed certain examinations at the University of Helsingfors.

Translator's note.

jesty, published in the „Government Messenger“ (in May 1889). The effect, however, of this step was of very short duration, if any. The attacks on Finland, and the urgent demands for its annihilation as a State, are continued with greater violence than ever, and recently in the „Moscow Gazette“ took the shape of such impudent censure of the Governor-General, Count Heiden's work in Finland, that the Minister of the Interior thought fit to interfere by administering to the paper a first warning.

The „Finn-devourers“, as the fanatical foes of Finland in the Russian press have been nicknamed, have had the doubtful good fortune of possessing in M. Ordin an authority whose every word they implicitly believe. Especially after the publication of his long expected work „Finland's subjugation“¹, he has been considered a veritable oracle on every question concerning Finland. The book appeared in two heavy volumes of respectively 460 and 498 p. p. To each volume belong several appendices. The importance of this work was greatly enhanced by the circumstance that the Russian „Academy of Science“, to which it had been presented as a manuscript, conferred a prize on it.

It having been left to a committee to estimate the

¹ Покореніє Финляндіи. Опытъ описанія по неизданнымъ источникамъ. К. Ордина. — Императорскою Академією Наукъ удостоено преміи Митрополита Макарія. — Въ двухъ томахъ. С. Петербургъ, 1889.

value of the book, this committee charged General Dubrovin, as being an expert, to give his opinion. By virtue of his report, a résumé of which was published in the „Government Messenger“, a prize was awarded to M. Ordin. According to the opinion of this expert M. Ordin's work „is of exceeding great value for the historical science of Russia“, because of the hitherto unknown facts it reveals. M. Dubrovin also points out that his knowledge of the Swedish language has been of great advantage to M. Ordin in his researches, because it has enabled him to make use of the existing historical literature in this language, without which he could not so satisfactorily have mastered the difficulties of the work he had undertaken. The General concludes by praising, as a great merit, „the calm and impartial attitude the author maintains in reference to the facts of which he treats“.

One is much tempted to ask whether this is spoken in irony. For this book which the General praises, far from being calm and impartial, breathes the bitterest hatred, and the attempt to reason away indisputable facts is one of its distinguishing features.

But all critics do not agree with the spokesman of the Academy of Science. In the April number of „The Historical Messenger“ (Istorichetsky Vestnik) 1890, M. Glinski calls M. Ordin's masterpiece „a wicked book, hostile to every new thought, every liberal idea“. In the „European Messenger“ the book is equally severely criticised. „It is pervaded“, says the author, „by a

particularly obnoxious odour, quite unpardonable in a scientific work“.

Thus even in Russia voices have been heard denouncing M. Ordin's mode of writing history. But they form solitary exceptions and are completely drowned in the cries of exultation, with which a great proportion of the daily press greeted a work where hatred of one race against another and bitter animosity against every particle of freedom and constitutional liberty run riot.

We have been hoping in Finland, and we still hope that the common sense of the Russian people, and their inborn sense of justice may at last assert themselves. Therefore we have hitherto been content to illustrate the general character of the book by pointing out some instances of the distortion of facts in which it abounds. But now it is no longer possible to leave ill alone. For a book that claims for itself the merit of a great scientific work, and rejoices in the protection of the „Academy of Science“, cannot be ignored, or thrown aside, as an ordinary libellous pamphlet. Under any circumstances it would have been necessary for the Finnish historians to make use of the new material bearing upon the history of Finland's Union with Russia, which has become available. M. Ordin's untruthful and spurious representation of facts makes this an indispensable duty. Independent of a complete exposition, circumstances demand a detailed examination of M. Ordin's work.

In doing this we are not going to limit ourselves to a negative criticism. We hope to place before the reader, though often only by way of hints or suggestions, the principal facts so that he may rightly understand them, as well as the real intentions of the personages who played a prominent part in this important period of our history.

II. THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

M. ORDIN's book does not treat only of the years 1808—1809 and the period immediately preceding. In an introductory historical review of the relations between the Russians and the Finns he retraces his steps to the time before the invasion of the Swedes into Finland. It would be wrong to expect more from such a narrative than that it should be compiled with scientific accuracy and discernment; bearing this in mind we are going to limit our remarks concerning the beginning of this work to some few particulars which characterise, to a certain extent, the author's mode of writing history.

The first chapter, entitled: „Russia and Finland to the time of Peter I“, is an exposition of facts evidently meant to prove that Russia's „historical rights“ to vast tracts in Finland date back to the distant past. In consequence the very first pages of the book are devoted to a polemic against the Finnish historian Yrjö-Koskinen, as well as against the Russian Solovieff, where these have not given the scanty existing materials the interpretation which would have best suited M. Ordín's theories. Thus he declares as an

indisputable fact that the old „Karelians“ were not allies of the Novgorodians, but tribute-paying subjects, and maintains the opinion that the „Jamers“, which the chronicle mentions as paying duty to Novgorod, did not live in the Onega district, but were identical with the „Tavasts“ in Finland. According to M. Ordin, Novgorod, during the 10:th and 11:th centuries included the greater part of southern Finland, while the northern part belonged to Norway. This new discovery he explains by quoting the Norwegian account of the tribute paid to them by Finns, „quod Finni iis solvunt“, consisting of furs, feathers, whalebones etc (Ordin 1, 7). He is then evidently ignorant of the fact that the Norwegians to this day apply the word Finn, not to the inhabitants of Finland, but to the Laplanders. His quotation from the well known narrative of the Norwegian Other is historically true, as long as the word Finn is attributed to the Laplanders, but when it is applied to the Finnish people the story comes into conflict with the indisputable fact that this people had not at that period extended its dwelling places so far north as the Arctic ocean. It has been proved beyond dispute that the colonisation of the northern part of the Saima and of the Uleo lake districts did not take place until many centuries later. M. Ordin supposes (I, 5, 6) that there existed roads leading from Kexholm to Kajana and Tavastehus, which roads forced Novgorod to extend its territory in Finland; but this is mere fancy. A critical study of the chronicles relating

to the continuous raids and inroads into the country leads to one result only, i. e. that both Swedes and Russians often made attacks on Finland, but that the victors never achieved lasting conquests, and had to content themselves with the war-booty or tribute they were able to extort. The frequent recurrence of these invasions proves this well enough. Under such circumstances the line of demarcation between two countries cannot be well determined.

But M. Ordin thought differently, and even added a map to his book where he indicated his opinion, partly borrowed from Nevolin and Butkoff, as to the localities through which, at different periods, the line of demarcation was drawn. In the years 1595 1617, 1721 and 1743 the borderline is known to have been quite settled, and there exists no doubt whatever about its exact situation. But this is not the case with the lines that are supposed to indicate Novgorod's territory in Finland before 1323, as well as according to the treaty which was concluded that year at Nöteborg.

The borderline supposed to have existed before 1323 is a curiosity, an outcome of M. Ordin's fancy, nothing more. It begins at the gulf of Finland between Viborg and Systerbäck, and, leaving Viborg on the Swedish, Villmanstrand and St. Michel on the Russian side, makes a large irregular semi-circle to the west into the interior of Finland, past Jyväskylä and Saarijärvi, and then it is drawn across Idensalmi and

Nurmis eastwards to the present frontier. Such a line of demarcation has never existed at all. After the conquest of Tavastland by Birger Jarl the Swedish dominion included that part of Finland which corresponds with the present provinces of Abo and Björneborg, Nyland, Tavastehus and Vasa. The frontier would then have been a straight line northward from the debouchement of the river Kymmene into the gulf of Finland by the eastern bank of lake Päijänne to one of the central Österbottnian rivers. This was not, however, the boundary between the Swedish and Russian territories which were separated by vast tracts of land, the Finnish inhabitants of which had not yet submitted to either Power.

M. Ordin's opinions about the treaty of Nöteborg are still more characteristic of him. Thanks to the united efforts of several historians the true significance of this treaty has at last been made clear, and that in a way much more advantageous to Russia than M. Ordin ever imagined — if a treaty concluded more than five centuries and a half ago and since then often altered and cancelled, can be considered to endow either party with any rights whatever. M. Ordin seems to have known a part only of the abundant literature bearing on this subject — and that part he has totally misunderstood.

The matter stands thus: The lines of demarcation that were drawn at the treaties of Nöteborg and Täysinä, which M. Ordin supposes to be identical, coin-

side only in the south, but separate already near lake Saima. The former line was drawn across the present site of Nyslott and Varkaus in a fairly straight direction to the gulf of Bothnia, i. e. in a north-western direction. The latter line went east of Nyslott and right north to the Arctic Ocean. The difference between the two is great, it forms quite a third part of present Finland. Northern and eastern Finland, at that time almost a desert, which Finnish industry and perseverance have changed into cultivated land, by the treaty of Nöteborg, at any rate nominally, remained a dependency of Novgorod. On account of this claim of supremacy prisoners, taken in war in northern Österbotten, were, up to 1496, carried away to Moscow to swear allegiance to the Czar of the Russians. The long work of cultivation, however, as well as fresh treaties have gradually created new boundaries, and have even up to our days obscured the significance of the treaty of Nöteborg. The Swede Rydberg is still of opinion that the line of demarcation terminated at the Arctic Ocean, although he admits that the lines drawn at the two above mentioned treaties differ considerably in the southern part. But M. Ordin, hardly understanding the point of contention, implicitly believes in the work of M. Nevolin, published in 1853 — in spite of his having copied from Rydberg the whole treaty, both in its Russian and Latin versions, and in spite of M. Yrjö-Koskinen having already in the first edition of his work, but

still more distinctly in the latter, indicated the right position of the line of demarcation between Finland and Russia.

That this view of the matter could have been adopted in Finland must have seemed inexplicable to an author who, though he considers the treaty of Nöteborg „possibly offensive to Russian feelings“, yet is comforted by the knowledge that it affords „an indisputable proof of the historical rights of Russia to the eastern part of Finland“. (Ordin I, 28). Here in Finland we have understood the matter differently. We have considered it exclusively from a scientific point of view, and taken it to be the duty of the historian to search after truth to the best of his abilities, without considering what might seem pleasant or not to the national feeling.

When he treats of the growth of the Greek Orthodox religion in Finland M. Ordin is almost as peculiar in his narrative as when the extension of the territory of Novgorod formed his subject. He is inclined to suppose (Ordin I, 17 etc.) that at least the whole tribe of the Karelians accepted Christianity in this form, and, being unable to produce historical evidence of his supposition, he is pleased to surmise that the Swedes probably in the course of time systematically destroyed all documents bearing on the subject (I, 12, note.) But of the existing documents concerning the fate of the Greek Religion in this country he is almost ignorant. He does not even

mention the results the Russian attack on Finland in 1656 under Alexei Mikhailovitch had on the religious confession of her inhabitants. The inhabitants of the county of Kexholm who belonged to the Greek confession took to their arms, and joined the Russians, but when the attack was repulsed they emigrated to Russia, dreading the vengeance of their Lutheran countrymen. These fugitives were replaced by settlers from all parts of Finland, and the adherents of the Greek faith, who had hitherto formed the greater part of the inhabitants, now shrunk into an inconsiderable minority. Even M. Ordin knows that emigrations to Russia have occurred, but he only mentions those of the least significance which took place immediately after the peace of Stolbova in 1617.

As an instance of the deep traces the early Russian dominion over Eastern Finland left in that country, M. Ordin describes the system of taxation in the province of Viborg. But as his knowledge of the subject is quite inadequate, his description is very confused. The more one reads of the book the more fully convinced one becomes of the fact that the author has an altogether false opinion of Swedish and Finnish social institutions and their development. He does not, to mention one instance, know the origin of the institution of land exempt from taxes, but supposes that all land possessed by the nobility originally was awarded by the king as a royal grant. (I, 112.)

After all this the reader will hardly be surprised to hear that M. Ordin, also in other matters, makes the most curious mistakes. He confounds the names of places that are somewhat similar in sound (I, 1, 16, 27 etc.) he mentions Åbo as capital in Nyland (I, 19, 20, 27), he thinks that Sigtuna was situated where Stockholm now is (I, 28), all of which are compromising enough, but more so for a Russian historian is perhaps the fact, that he does not even know where the fortress of Landskrona was situated, although its situation near the river Neva was a first acknowledgment of the importance of the mouth of this river from a strategic point of view. Having studied Swedish history from Dalin, he believes that this 150 year old and antiquated work also formed a basis for the researches of Yrjö-Koskinen, (I, 25, 26) and does not know that the old Swedish rhyming chronicle, begun at the commencement of the 14:th century gives authentic information on the site of old Landskrona.

M. Ordin's knowledge of the historical personages is not very intimate, either. He confounds the Swedish king Olaf Skötkonung with the king of Norway Olaf Tryggvason, and makes the latter, the greatest hero of his time in northern Europe, rule not only in Norway, but also in Sweden, just a quarter of a century after his death at Swolder (I, 5, 6); he marries Margaretha, the renowned perpetrator of the Calmar Union to her bitterest foe, Albrekt, whom she con-

quered and deprived of the throne of Sweden (I, 35), etc. — These instances, collected from a few pages, give sufficient evidence of the value of the beginning of M. Ordin's historical work.

In the history of Russia's attempt to separate Finland from Sweden the manifesto of the Empress Elisabeth, signed in Moscow on March 18:th, 1742 o. s., occupies a prominent place. She offers the assistance of Russia for the creation of an independent Finnish State, in case the Finnish people would like to sever their country from its union with Sweden. M. Ordin does not forget to mention this manifesto, (I 83—84,) he even inserts it among his supplements, but he never touches upon the questions it naturally gives rise to in the mind of the historian: what was its origin, what did the Russian Government intend by it, to what extent was the Empress prepared to keep the promises she made in it, etc. And yet he might have found in the accessible printed literature, without having resort to the archives, statements of some value, bearing on this subject. Solovieff, for instance, in his history of Russia, narrates the discussion at the great conference on February 24, 1743 in St. Petersburg, where the conditions of a peace with Sweden were discussed and where the then Vice-Chancellor, afterwards Grand-

Chancellor Alexei Bestuzheff, vindicated the idea of making Finland into a separate State, provided that Sweden could not be prevailed upon to give up the whole of Finland to Russia. — The questions concerning the origin of the manifesto, etc., have been treated at length in our work „Die Nordische Frage“ (the northern question) principally based on documents from the archives of the Foreign Office at Moscow.

If M. Ordin had possessed some knowledge of this book he might have avoided several aggravating blunders, and would have become cognisant of several facts bearing upon the relations between Finland and Russia in the 18:th century.

After the peace in Abo, so M. Ordin informs us, (I, 121) a plot was prepared with the object of offering the crown of Finland to the Grand Duke Peter Feodorovitch; one of those implicated in it, a certain Vikman, was executed. This statement is rather vague, for the peace in Abo was concluded in 1743 and Vikman's execution took place in 1751. And strange to say there never existed a plot with that object, though M. Ordin, relying on some antiquated historians, fully believes in it. Vikman, who had long been discharged from the petty office he once held had fallen into great poverty, and therefore easily became a tool in the hands of the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, Nikita Panin, or rather in those of his secretary, Johan Simolin. This happened at a period

when they were, at the Russian Embassy, on the lookout for agents capable of exciting and stirring up the political feeling in Finland favourably to the designs of Russia. The plan of separating Finland from Sweden, with the assistance of the Finns themselves, had again been brought into discussion in St. Petersburg on account of the differences between the Russian and Swedish Governments. A rescript of Nov. 30, 1749 empowered Panin to grant every reasonable demand to the Finns, whether they wished to become Russian subjects or to form a State under the protection of Russia. The sum of 50,000 Roubles which had been sent him the year before, to be used for the purpose of strengthening the opposition in Sweden, was now to be given as a salary to the emissary in Finland. Simolin entered into negotiations with Vikman who promised to induce the Finns to despatch a deputation to St. Petersburg. His real object, however, seems only to have been to get hold of money. He certainly departed to Finland, but did not do any political work. But this could not save him, for some of his letters, which had fallen into the hands of the Swedish Government, proved that he was entangled in treacherous plots against his country. Sentenced to death he was executed as a warning to many who, at that time, acted as tools in the intrigues of foreign Powers.

M. Ordin devotes 116 pages to the narrative of the relations between Finland and Russia from the most distant past till the beginning of Gustavus III's reign. In these 116 pages his account of the county of Viborg, carried on till the commencement of this century, is included. His narrative of the war between Gustavus III and Catharine, and a chapter devoted to the Finnish emigrant into Russia, Sprengtporten, which is closely connected with the former, occupy 253 pages. It is evident that he has changed his method. From the introduction he has come, if not quite to the principal part of his work, yet to a part so nearly connected with this, that it demands a much more detailed exposition than that which preceded it. That he has thus understood his task is undoubtedly a merit. Though he has only followed in the wake of Yrjö-Koskinen and others, yet his method deserves praise, because few have hitherto understood the necessity of an accurate study of the occurrences during the reigns of Gustavus III and Catharine II for a right comprehension of the incidents in 1808—1809.

We lay some stress on the expression „accurate“ We are sorry to say that not even this part of M. Ordin's work can lay any claim to this epithet. It is indeed largely based on rich and as yet un-published materials, from the archives of the Foreign Office in Moscow. He has even made ample use of these materials, but without discrimination, intermingling matters of great moment with such as are of no consequence,

and leaving out much that is of the greatest importance. Nor is M. Ordin by any means the first to make use of these documents. Already during the fifties and sixties a Finnish historian was permitted to peruse the documents and deeds in Moscow, and his copies partly form the basis for the comprehensive account of the political intrigues during the war of 1788—1790 which professor Tigerstedt gives us in his biography of Sprengtporten¹. The beginning of Tigerstedt's work was reported in a series of articles published in the journal of the Ministry of Public instruction in 1885 by the well known Academician, Privy Councillor Grot, formerly professor at the University of Helsingfors. M. Ordin refers to Grot's articles and is accordingly not ignorant of the existence of the biography. But he very inadequately avails himself of them, and gives no attention to the latter and more important part of the work which Grot does not refer to in his articles, because they have, for some reason or other, been left unfinished. M. Ordin, who prides himself on his knowledge of the Swedish language, and who was awarded the academic prize, with this particular merit specially mentioned, thus leaves without consideration the newest and most complete exposition (in Swedish) of Sprengtporten's work, and of the Anjala confederacy. Accordingly he naturally remains ignorant of the most important documents bearing on the sub-

¹ Printed in *Finsk Tidskrift* in 1877 et seq.

ject, which Tigerstedt and his predecessor Yrjö-Koskinen collected from non-Russian sources. These documents consist, for the greater part, of the correspondence of the men whose ultimate aim was independence for Finland, with one another, and with the Russian Government, some of which is to be found in Russian archives, but the greater number has been lying hidden and unheeded in different places in Finland. Naturally, one part completes the other, and those who, like M. Ordin, confine their attention to the Russian collections only, must necessarily submit to their narratives being found wanting and deficient.

We do not mean to say, however, that Tigerstedt's exposition of the Anjala confederacy is so complete as not to want completion, and correction. It wants both, especially in the beginning, because Tigerstedt published his work in the shape of articles for a periodical, and did not, when the first were printed, possess the rich material of which he later on was able to avail himself. The collection from Moscow, for instance, was not accessible to him until after he had published the article on the early history of the Anjala confederacy, as well as several chapters concerning the incidents in 1788. One would think, therefore, that the corresponding parts of M. Ordin's work must necessarily contain some fresh information of interest. They do contain some, we are pleased to say, but the most important facts which he might have collected from the sources that are open to him,

are missing. He has either not noticed, or he has suppressed them. We ask the reader to judge for himself.

The soul of the Finnish independence or Home Rule party was, as is well known, George Magnus Sprengtporten. His treasonable connection with the Russian court began in 1786, when he communicated to the Empress, through the Russian Ambassador at the Hague, a plan he had formed to separate Finland from Sweden, and to create a Finnish republic. It is a well known fact that Sprengtporten took this step, and even M. Ordin mentions it (I, 123) but nothing more. He does not inform his readers how Sprengtporten meant the severance of Finland from Sweden to be effected, nor what were his ideas of the future republic's relations to Russia. And yet, among the documents at the Foreign Office archives in Moscow, there is a memorandum in which Sprengtporten explains all his plans. The document, which bears the title: „Précis d'un tableau sur l'équilibre du Nord, considéré dans le project de rendre la Finlande indépendante“, is added to a dispatch from the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm, Markoff of the ^{31 May}_{11 June} 1786. It is the same scheme which Sprengtporten had somewhat earlier imparted to Kolitcheff at the Hague. After his return from Holland he had addressed himself to Markoff and given him a copy of it. The document is a programme for the work of the Finnish Independence party during the period 1786—1808. M.

Ordin pretends to give a detailed account of the doings of this party, but to him this document is absolutely unknown.

Of course he is equally ignorant of the attitude of the Russian Government towards Sprengtporten's plan, though the archives in Moscow give authentic information also on this point. On the cover of Sprengtporten's project there is a note written by the Empress and beginning thus: „Si le projet de l'indépendance de la F. était une question? la réponse que ce projet n'est pas contraire aux intérêts de la Russie ne serait pas difficile à trouver“.

In accordance with this conviction of hers that the separation of Finland from Sweden would serve Russia's interests, Catharine commanded her Ambassador in Stockholm to invite Sprengtporten to go to St. Petersburg, and there to give a detailed explanation of his design. Markoff was also empowered to offer him certain advantages, in case he could be prevailed upon to enter the Russian service, naturally with the right of returning to his country whenever he thought fit¹.

Sprengtporten obeyed the summons and arrived in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1786. His original intention was that the revolt should break out the same year, so late in the season as to make any communication between Finland and Sweden impossible, or

¹ The Empress to Markoff, Tsarskoe Selo 1^o June.

nearly so. The enterprise not being carried out that year, he wrote to the Russian Ministers early next spring in order to obtain the cooperation of Russia for the realisation of his plan the following autumn. M. Ordin of course is ignorant of this, the first letter by Sprengtporten he mentions bearing on the subject is of the autumn of 1787, and, referring to it, he adds these words: „The end of the year 1787 may be considered as the beginning of Sprengtporten's activity prejudicial to Russia“. (I, 348 compare with I, 126 and II, 146).

The most energetic and active supporter of Sprengtporten's plans among the Finnish officers was a distant relation ¹ of his, Major J. A. Jägerhorn. Neither M. Ordin, nor the earlier literature, give any information of the fact that Jägerhorn was in relation with the Russian Government, before he arrived in St. Petersburg, sent by the conspirators in August 1788. If he had dived somewhat deeper into the sources which supplied him with information, M. Ordin would have met with a report by Rasumofsky, Markoff's successor in Stockholm, dated $\frac{24 \text{ March}}{4 \text{ April}}$ 1787, where the Russian Minister gives an account of a secret conversation with Jägerhorn. While Sprengtporten in St. Petersburg tried to work upon the Russian Government by means of his memorials, Jägerhorn attempted, through Ra-

¹ Not a nephew, as M. Ordin, misunderstanding an expression of Sprengtporten's, several times calls him.

sumofsky, to induce Russia to send an army into Finland.

Her relations to Turkey, however, made the Empress disinclined to cause a rupture also with Sweden by openly supporting the Finnish frondeurs. The situation changed when in the spring of 1788 it was made clear that Gustavus III was preparing for a war. The Empress determined to adopt the Finnish plan for Independence and use it as a weapon against her unruly neighbour. Among the supplements to his work M. Ordin inserts the very letter of Sprengtporten to the Empress which establishes this fact beyond a doubt. But in the book itself he never mentions it. Naturally the reader is not informed why Sprengtporten did not succeed in establishing, before the commencement of the war, a definite plan of campaign between the Russian Government and the leaders of the Finnish malcontents. On this subject the contents of the archives in Moscow, as well as a letter by Jägerhorn to Sprengtporten, dated Malmgård, May 20, 1788, published in Swedish by Tigerstedt, and in Russian by Grot, might have served him as a guide.

The struggle between the ancient rivals in the North began. Gustavus commenced the war, disregarding the Swedish Constitution, which prescribed that an aggressive war should not be entered on without the consent of the Estates of the realm¹. This soon fanned into a

¹ It is well known, that the plan of Gustavus to land troops in Ingermanland was frustrated by the circumstance that the

flame the discontent that had been smouldering among the Swedish and Finnish officers. The laxity of political morals, a sad inheritance from the period of 1718—1772, caused even noble characters to commit deeds which stamped them as traitors to their country. Thus it happened that Jägerhorn found himself in St. Petersburg, in the beginning of August 1788, sent, without the knowledge of the King, by some officers of the army, in order to open negotiations with the enemy for the suspension of hostilities. This com-

issue of the battle of Hogland on July 7, 1788 remained undecided. Ordin several times mentions this sea-fight as having taken place at *Gottland* (I, 144, 145, 146). We first believed this mistake to be a misprint, especially as M. Ordin later on mentions Hogland as the place where the battle was fought (I 232). A closer examination of the subject proves, however, that this mistake is a consequence of M. Ordin's ignorance. For he begins his description of the battle with these words: „After not having found the Swedes in the Gulf of Finland, Greigh's fleet met their chief force a few miles to the west of Gottland at Kalbada reefs“. (I, 144). Thus, though it seems incredible, it is nevertheless the case that this author, to whom the Academy of Science awarded the prize founded by the Metropolitan Markary, does not know that the battle took place in the Gulf of Finland, but believes it to have been fought in the Baltic. One might be tempted to ask whether it is to such hitherto unknown facts in the history of the northern wars, that General Dubrovin refers when he speaks of M. Ordin's work as of „exceeding great value for the historical science of Russia“. Or did the General possess a superficial knowledge only of the work he recommended as worthy of the Academy's prize?

mission, however, Jägerhorn used only as a means to obtain the higher aim he had set himself. Shortly after having delivered to the Russian Government the memorial signed by the malcontents, which treated of the conditions under which peace might be concluded, he put into their hands another document signed by himself alone, where he insisted on Finland's separation from Sweden as an independent State. For a long time thus much was known of Jägerhorn's doings in St. Petersburg, though the researches left a gap on account of the text of his memorial not being known. We are therefore astonished to find that M. Ordin not only omits to mention this memorial, but maintains that Jägerhorn could not or would not express his opinion on the project of separating Finland from Sweden. (I, 169).

Our astonishment at this omission is so much the better founded that everything we have hitherto known of this document, is derived from the Russian literature. In the periodical „Ruskaya Starina“ for 1876 appeared the posthumous memoirs of Colonel Garnowsky, who was at the time of the war between Sweden and Russia intimately connected with prince Potemkin and with the favourite of the Empress, Count Mamonoff. Garnowsky relates that on the very day of Jägerhorn's arrival, the Empress charged Mamonoff to find out what his commission was, and what he aimed at. Mamonoff arranged for Garnowsky to be present at the meeting, and, placing him behind a

screen, made him take down every word Jägerhorn spoke. According to Garnowsky's notes one of the objects of his desires was that the Empress might „in the future deliver the Finns from the Swedish rule, and make them into an independent nation with an administration of their own“. (Ruskaya Starina 1876 p.209). According to the same authority Jägerhorn promised to draw up a statement setting forth the wishes of his countrymen. This then was the origin of his memorial.

It is difficult to conceive how M. Ordin could have omitted to notice this, especially as the memorial is mentioned not only in the diary of the private Secretary of the Empress, Khrapovitsky (which diary everybody who has studied the history of those times is supposed to know) but also in the printed protocols of the Russian State Council¹. On the other hand it is easy to understand that with M. Ordin's habit of skimming the documents he never found out that he might have enriched our knowledge of the Anjala confederacy with the actual tenor of that long missing and much searched for document, for the archives in Moscow possess — as was to be supposed — the original memorial, dated St. Petersburg Aug. 1, 1788.

This document is so lengthy that it is impossible here to give a summary of its contents. We will only point out that, according to his own assertion, it was drawn up on the basis of the manifesto of the Em-

¹ Архивъ Государственнаго Совѣта, Г. I, стр. 590.

press Elisabeth of March 18:th, 1742. This is one proof among others which testify that the foundation of the Finnish plans for Independence was to a great extent laid by invitations proceeding from the Russian Government.

We now transfer our attention to the time when Jägerhorn, after his return from St. Petersburg, worked for the plan of Independence among the Finnish officers and Sprengtporten led the negotiations from the Russian side, and we find that M. Ordin's description is so minute as often to encompass the most insignificant details. The reader is naturally led to suppose that M. Ordin has made an extensive study of the existing literature referring to the subject, and that he has fully availed himself of all the manuscript materials he could obtain. But it is not so. That which should have been the principal object of the historian, to disclose the hidden meaning of the game that was being played, M. Ordin does not consider a subject worthy of his attention.

Before the departure of Jägerhorn from St. Petersburg, Sprengtporten had made out a programme for the further activity of the Independence party¹. It was laid before the Empress, and evidently approved by her, and contains an exposé of measures, that were soon after resorted to by the Finnish confederates.

¹ Compare: „Copie des instructions données à M. de Jägerhorn pour être mises à son Excellence le Comte d'Ostermann“. Archives of the Foreign Office at Moscow.

It proposes, for instance, the sending off of a deputation to the King, demanding that the Estates should be instantly convoked, and of a summons to the Swedish officers to join their efforts with those of the Finns. The deputation was sent off, as well as the summons to the officers. M. Ordin mentions these measures, but not Sprengtporten's programme.

In the meantime the Empress was highly dissatisfied with the indecision the Finns, according to her opinion, were guilty of, because they could not be prevailed upon to give the Russians active assistance. She explains her opinion of the position in a letter to Sprengtporten of ^{26 Aug.}_{6 Sept.}, a draft of which is inserted among the posthumous papers of Khrapovitsky in the museum of Rumyantsoff in Moscow. It was published by the Swede, Professor Odhner in 1882 in the „Historisk Tidskrift," p. 70 etc., edited by the Swedish Historical Society. The Empress supposes that Gustavus III meant with the assistance of his army to force the Estates to approve his measures. Therefore, in order to protect themselves against his vengeance, the Finns must assist in the expulsion of the Swedes, first from Högfors on the Kymmene, the only place they possessed on the Russian side of the frontier, and afterwards from all Finland. „Cette côte une fois entre nos mains, je vous garantis messieurs les Finnois à l'abri de toutes les violences du roi de Suède. Vous voyez par tout ce que je viens de dire, que mon avis invariable est que le meilleur état des choses

pour le présent serait de continuer à les convaincre qu'une diète particulière en Finlande leur est indispensablement nécessaire pour être chez eux les maîtres des délibérations“.

Prof. Odhner pronounces his opinion on the value of the instructions the Empress had given to Sprengtporten by calling the document in question „a momentous turning point in the history of the Anjala confederacy“. It was in consequence thereof, he thinks, that Sprengtporten later on wrote to General Armfelt a letter reported by Tigerstedt, bidding the Anjala leaders convoke a separate Finnish Diet and place themselves under the protection of Russia. In this way their plans as well as Russia's intentions were laid bare too soon, and the majority of the confederates who were no adherents of the Independence idea, recoiled at the proposal of committing an action which would at once have stamped them as traitors to their country. They stood irresolute, and so enabled the commander, the Duke of Södermanland, to disband the Finnish army. „This virtually gave the death blow to the confederacy“.

Need we add that M. Ordin knows neither the Empress' nor Sprengtporten's letters? Yet both are accessible, the former at the Rumyantsoff museum, a copy of the latter at the archives of the Foreign Office of Moscow¹.

¹ „Copie de la lettre de M:r de Sprengtporten à M:r le Général d'Armfelt de Sippola ce 14 sept. 1788, avec un projet pour

On Sept. 25:th the Swedes quitted Högfors, and so the Russian part of Finland was evacuated. The documents with which Tigerstedt makes us acquainted inform us that this was beyond a doubt a result of Sprengtporten's and Jägerhorn's persuasions. But according to M. Ordin it still remains to be proved that Sprengtporten had any voice in the matter. (I, 196). He also accuses the latter of having by means of intrigues kept the Russians from energetically and effectually carrying on the war. „The Russian army followed the lead of a Swedish deserter“. (I, 232). It is worth our while trying to find out what was the opinion of the Russian Government on the subject.

On the 30:th of December 1788 Catharine in a rescript to the State Council writes: „I have been made cognisant of the fact that it is impossible, either now or in the future, to gain any advantage over the enemy with the 8 incomplete regiments that are stationed in Finland, and therefore command the Foreign Office to bid the Finns who are kindly disposed towards us to make whatever arrangements they may consider conducive to their safety¹“. It was by no means the Empress only who considered the Russian army in Finland insufficient. The Vice-Chancellor Count Ostermann, in several of his memorials, of which M. Ordin hardly takes any notice, dissuaded the Em-

la proclamation de la Diète“. Archives of the Foreign Office of Moscow.

¹ Khrapovitsky's diary.

press from opening hostilities too soon. He resolutely held to this opinion at the conference which took place on January 14, 1789 in the Russian State Council (not mentioned by M. Ordin) where a winter expedition, proposed by Jägerhorn in the beginning of December, after his return to St. Petersburg, was discussed. Ostermann maintains that Russia should not commence a war, before her armies were enlarged and in a position to offer the Finns protection and, if necessary, to attack the enemy without them.¹ This was how the leading spirits looked upon the position. It belongs to the historian to dive deep into the question, and to settle whether they had sufficiently conclusive and objective reasons for their opinions, but to judge of the incidents of the past by the light which is most flattering for the tendencies of the present, is foreign to History.

— It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that M. Ordin continuously holds fast to his opinion, that Russia in 1788, when the greater part of her army was engaged in the war against Turkey, should have been able energetically to carry on the fight in Finland. When it suits his intentions he does not scruple to admit that the Empire was in a dangerous position. On page 182 (I) he tries to make excuses for Catharine for having entered into negotiations with the rebellious subjects of another Empire. He mentions several extenuating circumstances in her defence. One is the

¹ Архивъ Государственнаго Совѣта, Г. I, стр. 659.

difficult position of the Empire, another the fact that Sweden had begun the hostilities, and the circumstance finally, on which he lays most stress, is that Catharine in her heart of hearts despised both Sprengtporten and his accomplices. His private opinion is that everybody not devoid of good feeling and common sense must needs despise the Finnish confederates. The moral feeling of which this opinion is an outcome, would certainly deserve our regard, if it were real. But how is it possible to believe in it, in a work, the ultimate aim of which is to prove that the most binding and solemn promises made by a Russian monarch, for himself and his successors, are of no value whatever. We will, however, ignore the author's private opinion and only take notice of the colouring, which he gives to the Empress' actions.

Catharine's relations with the Finnish officers did not, as M. Ordin represents, diverge from the usual proceedings of the Russian Government, they were on the contrary a direct application of the principles Russia had followed ever since the manifesto of the Empress Elisabeth in 1742. M. Ordin not only does not understand this, but he makes her negotiations with the Anjala men appear as the result of the private politics of the Empress. In support of this assertion he quotes (I 183) Khrapovitsky's diary for Aug. 14 o. s. 1788, which reports that the Empress had commanded him to read in the State Council a report from the Commander-in-Chief, Musin Pushkin, „but

to show no one the beginning of the report, which refers to Sprengtporten's journey and his negotiations with the Finnish commanding officers". The simple and natural circumstance that the Empress did not choose to inform a large body of men, such as the State Council, of secret business that was just being transacted, M. Ordin represents in such a light as to make the reader believe, that the Empress had hidden from her Council the fact of her negotiations, because she was ashamed of them, as being immoral, before the men whose advice she was wont to take. The truth is that the only one who has kept hidden anything of consequence is M. Ordin himself. He keeps the reader ignorant of the fact, that, when Jägerhorn was in St. Petersburg in August 1788, his private memorial, as well as that of the Finnish officers, was by the Empress submitted to the consideration of the State Council. The Council fully approved of the negotiations, „and, since Finland's union with Sweden can never be to our advantage, we must stipulate, above all, for the separation of Finland from that country". „Therefore this Finnish deputy ought to be told, that his countrymen's dislike of the war, their openness, and their just confidence in Her Majesty, cannot be displeasing to Her Imperial Majesty; and that, if they continue in this mood, they may rest assured of Her Majesty's gracious protection; and that if they really wish, as soon as possible, to put an end to the miseries of the war, and to come into

the enjoyment of peace and of the independence they are longing for, they must by means of persuasion, or otherwise, prevail upon the Swedish army to leave Finland; they must convoke their own Diet, declare themselves independent, frame the laws, which the Estates themselves may recognise as conducive to the welfare of the country, by means of a new form of Government, independent of all save God alone; that Her Majesty will solemnly and for ever confirm all their resolutions, if the Swedish King and his army oppose their attempt at independence so effectually, that they cannot obtain it without the assistance of others, the Empress will order her army to the support of all those who love their country!¹ M. Ordin conceals this communication of the Council as well as the fact that when the Empress, despairing at last of the possibility of realising the plan of Finland's independence, was inclined to inform the Finns that they must no longer count on the assistance of Russia the Council dissuaded her from taking such a step. One ought on the contrary — such was the Council's opinion — to further assure the well-meaning Finns of the Empress' protection, in order to encourage them to work more energetically for Finland's independence, which would be of advantage to Russia¹.

How does all this agree with M. Ordin's representation of facts. There is an old rule, already laid

¹ Архивъ Государственнаго Совѣта Т. I, стр. 591.

down by the ancients, that the historian must never state a falsehood, never suppress the truth. „Ne quid falsi audeat, ne quid veri non audeat historia“, says Cicero. M. Ordin's besetting sin is a suppression of important facts, directly bearing on the subject, hence he often gives the reader quite a wrong impression of things.

Our sketch of this part of M. Ordin's work would be altogether incomplete, if we omitted to insert some instances of the accusations and invectives he heaps upon those who have fallen under his displeasure, especially Sprengtporten, who certainly is an unusually fitting object for such treatment. Frivolous, vindictive and ambitious Sprengtporten, not without cause compared to Patkul, forgot the fealty he owed his lawful Sovereign, and often resorted to intrigues as the only means of overcoming the great obstacles which separated him from the aim he had set himself: Finland's separation from Sweden as an independent State. He has been severely blamed by his contemporaries as well as by posterity; so severely indeed by his latest Finnish biographer, professor Tigerstedt, that he would hardly have thought it possible, that this severity would soon be surpassed by a citizen of the country to the enlargement of whose power Sprengtporten's plans, if they succeeded, must have certainly contributed. Such is however the case. To the many accusations which have, deservedly or not, been heaped upon Sprengtporten M. Ordin adds one. He tries to

make his readers believe that this poor politician, at least once in his life, showed himself not ignorant of the art of appropriating public money. In a rescript of September 14:th 1788 o. s. the Empress commanded Count Musin Pushkin to remit, through Sprengtporten, to Baron Hastfehr — a Swedish officer who had declared himself willing to work for the separation of Finland — as a first reward a sum of 500 or 1000 ducats. A letter from Hastfehr, however, makes it appear likely that he never got the money. „Did Sprengtporten pocket it? We know of no fact proving this beyond a doubt, but his excessive carelessness in money matters makes this explanation plausible enough“. (O. I, 242—243). So far M. Ordin. Let us now see whether the documents confirm his opinion.

In the rescript of Sept. 14:th the Empress desires Musin Pushkin to send Hastfehr 500 or 1000 ducats, and from a letter from the latter to Sprengtporten, dated Heinola, October 16:th, it appears beyond a doubt that he had not then received the money. But this is not all the letter proves. It informs us that Hastfehr not only expected a small sum of money, but hoped that the Empress would pay all his debts, for he was known to be ruined, and this not being done, he refused to accept the money Sprengtporten repeatedly offered him. Hastfehr writes:

„Voyant donc de toute façon que je ne puis ni suivre mon inclination, c'est à dire, celle de servir Sa M. I. à condition qu'Elle daigna généreusement payer mes

dettes, ni entamer une révolution pour ce moment dans le pays — *je ne dois non plus accepter l'offre renouvelée que vous me faites de l'argent*“. This letter Sprengtporten, according to Khrapovitskys' diary for the ½ Oct. 1788, (which M. Ordin not seldom refers to) laid before the Empress. Hence, with a knowledge of, and even referring to, Hastfehr's letter, which states that he did not think it right to accept the money Sprengtporten had offered him, and with a knowledge also of the fact that the Empress was informed of this letter — M. Ordin yet tries to make it appear at least probable that Sprengtporten kept the money for his own use.

But enough of this. The edifice M. Ordin has raised thus falls to pieces at the slightest touch. We must add, however, that we have not had the opportunity of comparing his account of the peace of Wäralä in 1790 with the documents in the archives, and therefore we cannot pronounce a definite opinion on this part of the work, but turn our attention to the following period.

III. 1808, THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

M. ORDIN's account of the incidents which led to the outbreak of the war in February 1808 is very insufficient. He does not even inform his readers that the Russian attack on Finland was not a spontaneous outcome of the wishes of the Russian Government or of the Russian people, but rather a consequence of the demand Napoleon had made at Tilsit, that the Emperor Alexander should force his brother-in-law, the King of Sweden, to adopt the Continental System. Probably M. Ordin's opinion of what is due to the honour of the Russian Empire, is the cause of this silence. This care of Russia's honour is probably also the motive, which induces him to make the utterly unhistoric assertion, that Russia had no allies either in her former wars with Sweden, or in that of 1808. „Neither Poland in the time of Peter“ — says our author — „nor Denmark, nor even France at the time of the peace of Tilsit, can be considered as such“. (II, 1). The reader, we are sorry to say, is not told in what light to look for instance upon the relations between Russia and Denmark, when in the Great Northern War of 1700—1721, further in 1788 and finally in 1808—

1809, both Powers, in consequence of the alliance they had formed, attacked Sweden simultaneously. Nor is he informed whether to consider Napoleon as Russia's *foe* when he in 1808 commanded Marshal Bernadotte with his army to cross over from Germany to the Danish isles, in order to make, with the Danish forces, a descent upon Skåne.

Of the significance of the part that Sprengtporten played in the preparations for the war M. Ordin hardly gives an idea. Yet this part was very important.

The Imperial Library in St. Petersburg is in possession of a diary of General Golenitscheff-Kutuzoff embracing the years 1806—1814. From this diary we learn that the Minister of the Marine, Tchitchagoff in Dec. 1807, perceiving that the Swedish fleet was stronger than the Russian, conceived the idea of taking by surprise that part of it which was stationed in Finland. He had long conferences with Sprengtporten on the subject and caused the Emperor to grant the latter an audience. Hence Sprengtporten was present at the following discussions, where the plan of campaign was decided upon. These statements made by Kutuzoff are verified by documents in the Foreign Office archives in St. Petersburg, such as a treatise by Sprengtporten, with two appendices, dated January 1, 1808 o. s., called: „Réflexions d'un militaire russe, natif de la Finlande“. In this treatise Sprengtporten emphasises the advantages which would accrue to Russia from Finland's separation from Sweden and urges the Emperor to an

immediate attack. These „reflections“ also contain other things of great political interest. Sprengtporten proposes, for instance, as being of advantage also to Russia, the reunion of the province of Viborg to the rest of Finland, which was effected by Alexander I in 1812. One of the supplements is a draft of the famous declaration which was issued at the beginning of the war, and which greatly influenced the future position of Finland, because it contained the Emperor's promise of convoking the Finnish Estates, and of confirming all their old liberties and rights. In the second supplement Sprengtporten indicates how the war in Finland should be carried out. This proposition of his was used as a basis for the detailed plan of campaign formed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Buxhoevden, and in all principal parts adhered to. It was Sprengtporten's plan that the attack should begin at three different points, the first division of the army marching on Helsingfors, the second on Tavastehus, and the third from Nyslott through the northern part of Savolax to Österbotten, thus cutting off the Finns from the line of retreat on Sweden.

M. Ordin knows these documents only in part. He mentions in a note (II 14) that Sprengtporten had made a plan, „somewhat similar“ to that of Buxhoevden, and quotes, also *en passant*, a few words from Sprengtporten's treatise, but without giving an account of its contents, or of in what relation it stood to

the finally adopted plan¹. He has, however, been obliged to admit that the proclamation to the Finnish people was inspired by Sprengtporten, but he declares (II, 19) that it was written in Russian at the Foreign Office, then translated into French, and revised by Sprengtporten. The sketch which accompanied his treatise was in fact written in Swedish; translated into Russian at the Foreign Office it was subjected to some alterations, the most important of which was that the proclamation was issued in the name of the Commander-in-Chief, instead of in that of the Emperor, as Sprengtporten had proposed².

Throughout his work M. Ordin mentions this proclamation as having been issued on February 10:th. o. s. In the archives there certainly is a written copy bearing this date, but if M. Ordin had thought the matter over, he would have found that it must be wrong. The proclamation was issued at Fredrikshamn,

¹ M. Ordin quotes here (II, 8) Sprengtporten's letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rumyantsoff, of January 21:st, 1808. This, however, is an obvious mistake. The sentence he quotes is not to be found in the letter, but in the „Observations à ajouter concernant le local“, which Sprengtporten refers to as belonging to his New-year's „Reflections“, though they are in the archives placed together with the letter of Jan. 21:st. There is also in the same archives a Russian translation of these „observations“.

² This manuscript was later on returned to Sprengtporten and is now kept among the rest of his papers in the University library at Helsingfors.

on the Russian side of the frontier, and preceded the Russian invasion. But the Russians crossed the frontier under the command of Buxhoevden already on February $\frac{9}{11}$ and the proclamation, as it was distributed in Finland, is in fact dated Feb. $\frac{6}{18}$ 1808.

M. Ordin, (I, 375—436) borrows his description of the war of 1808—1809 almost exclusively from a work by Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky „Description of the Finnish war by land and by sea, in 1808 and 1809“. Based on a fairly conscientious study of the collections of documents in the Russian War office archives and published by „command of his most gracious Majesty“, this work is no bad authority, though it naturally must be studied by the side of the Finnish and Swedish historians. M. Ordin, however, thinks such a comparison quite superfluous. Therefore whenever Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky makes a mistake, the same mistake is reproduced by M. Ordin. Both, for instance, speak of the raids of the „Guerilla-warrior“ Fieandt in the rear of the Russian army. Fieandt was not a „Guerilla warrior“, but a Major, having a command in the regular army. (M.-D. p. 60, Ordin I, 386).

Sometimes, however, he deviates from Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky. About the battle of Siikajoki which formed a turning-point in the war M. Ordin says that the losses amounted to about 1,000 men on either side. (I, 380). This statement is supported by no quotation. According to Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky the loss on the Russian side amounted to 350 men; according to

Swedish authors the number of the killed and the prisoners somewhat exceeded 400¹. Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky gives no account of the Finnish losses, but according to the most reliable Finnish and Swedish authorities they amounted to about 200 men. M. Ordin maintains that neither side conquered; Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky, though he rightly considers the affair of small importance as a battle, yet calls it „the defeat of Kulneff at Siikajoki“, and it is a fact that the Russian centre was broken, and that their divisions were routed and pursued.

The battle of Siikajoki was followed by several others with the same result, but far more important. The disgrace that the capitulation of Sveaborg had attached to the Finnish and Swedish arms was washed away in blood at Revolaks, Pulkila, Lappo, Alavo and a number of other battles, which the Finns have the more cause to think of with pride, because their fathers fought most of them all alone, without assistance from Sweden, and in spite of the utter incapacity of the Commander whom the Swedish King had given them. The Russian defeats and misfortunes M. Ordin attributes in the first place to Sprengtporten (e. g. I, 385 and II, 9). The false statements of Sprengtporten and other Finnish Emigrants concerning the affection of the Finnish people for Russia caused the Emperor

¹ Compare: Mankell, *Anteckningar rörande finska armeens och Finlands krigshistoria*, II, 66.

to send too small an army into Finland, he says. This accusation, though by no means new, is on the whole undeserved.

In his above-mentioned New-year's reflections „Réflexions d'un militaire russe, natif de la Finlande“, Sprengtporten represents the readiness of the Finns to work with the Russian army as very doubtful¹ and concludes his sketch of a plan of campaign, made at the same time, with these words „Enfin le secret et la liberté est ici ce qu'il y a de plus à observer pour tomber autant que possible à l'improviste sur les quartiers des troupes finnoises, lesquelles étant trop faibles pour se défendre en campagne et même trop dispersées pour se rassembler promptement, tacheront sans doute de se replier sur les forteresses mentionnées [Sveaborg et Tavastehus], où la résistance, si notre proclamation qui précédera l'invasion ne fera son effet, peut devenir aussi opiniâtre, car les Finnois, de bonne volonté, sont reconnus les plus braves des troupes suédoises de l'aveu même de ses usurpateurs.

Sprengtporten here considers that a force of 20,000 or 25,000 would be sufficient to carry on operations, but he proposes the forming of a reserve force „pour prendre dans le pays les positions de l'armée agissante à mesure qu'elle s'avance sur Abo“. In his „Réflexions“ again he proposes „20,000 hommes en activité

¹ „Je dis peut-être. Car les esprits se sont beaucoup refroidis depuis ce temps [1788] par la mollesse avec laquelle leur confédération à Anjala fut soutenue“.

et autant en réserve". The Russian Government acted in accordance with one of these propositions, that which concerned the active army, but for some time took no notice of the other. Therefore it is wrong to blame Sprengtporten because the Russian army was too weak successfully to continue acting on the offensive, after it had penetrated to the North of Finland, and after it had been forced to leave strong detachments outside Sveaborg and Svartholm, and to garrison Abo and other places of importance. After the first great success Sprengtporten certainly took an optimistic view of the matter, but only as far as the attitude of the educated classes was concerned, and there is in no document any hint at all of his having dissuaded the Russian Government from sending Buxhoevden the reinforcement he repeatedly asked for during the spring and summer of 1808, though he, too, had originally considered the invading forces strong enough. (Compare Buxhoevden's letter to the Minister of War Feb. $\frac{1}{2}$ 1808. Archives of the W. O.).

Though M. Ordin devotes very little attention to the events of the war of 1808—1809, he gives a most elaborate account of the purely political relations between the Russian Government and the Finns from the beginning of the war to the peace of Fredrikshamn. He devotes to this narrative the whole of the second volume,

with the exception of one chapter, which deals with the treaty of peace with Sweden.

Immediately after the beginning of the war there arose at the court in St. Petersburg two different currents of opinions on the position Finland ought to occupy after the conquest. According to one the Finnish Grand Duchy ought to have a separate political existence under the sceptre of the Emperor with the maintenance of the Constitution the country had hitherto possessed in common with Sweden. Nor were the relations between Finland and Russia to be settled onesidedly by an Imperial decree, but by the collaboration of the Emperor with the Finnish Estates at a Diet in Abo, where the representatives of the Finnish people were to take the oath of allegiance to their new Sovereign, and the Emperor was to pledge himself to maintain the Constitution. The author and promulgator of this idea was no other than Sprengporten, though he had some time before, in his New-year's reflections, proposed Finland's being placed under a Russian protectorate, with a Grand Duke, chosen from among the members of the Russian Imperial family¹.

The opposite party wanted to consider Finland as a Russian province, to the inhabitants of which the Emperor might graciously accord certain exceptional liberties and rights, but whose former Swedish-Fin-

¹ This detail is not mentioned by M. Ordin.

nish Constitution he ought by no means to confirm, and whose Estates he ought not to convoke with the end Sprengtporten had in view. Strange to say the most eager adherent of this faction was, like Sprengtporten, a Finn and, like him, belonged to the Finnish emigrants in Russia. To attempt an explanation of this psychological problem would carry us too far from our present subject. We must content ourselves with a simple statement of the fact that one of the Anjala confederates, K. H. Klick, in 1788 the author of the Finnish officers' note to the Empress Catharine, in 1808 was the most violent opponent to Sprengtporten's plans for Finland's future.

At first Sprengtporten's influence prevailed. The Emperor issued a declaration such as Sprengtporten had proposed and in which the promise to convoke a Diet was included. He also commanded Sprengtporten to accompany the Russian army, in order to assist — *sous le rapport diplomatique* — with his counsels Count Buxhoevden in the necessary negotiations with the Finns. Sprengtporten departed, but after a few weeks sought for permission to return, which was granted him. The cause of this speedy return was a violent quarrel between himself and Buxhoevden, which made it impossible for them to work together.

In the meanwhile Klick had gained some influence over the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rumyantsoff, and made him disinclined to negotiate with representatives, against the convocation of whom, while the final issue

of the war was yet undetermined influential persons in Finland even had pronounced themselves. In consequence, the Emperor after having on March $\frac{1}{2}$ through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced to the European Governments his firm intention of incorporating Finland with the Russian Empire, issued another proclamation to the Finns on April $\frac{2}{10}$, through Count Rumyantsoff, declaring the intended convocation of a Diet inexpedient under present circumstances, wherefore it was put off indefinitely. Now Klick's proposition that the oath of allegiance should be demanded, not at a Diet, but according to the forms observed in Finland and Sweden on the accession to the throne of a new Sovereign, also came into execution.

But soon the tables were turned. Sveaborg certainly capitulated, but the victories of the Finnish army and violent risings in different parts of the country, as well as the attempt of the Swedes to effect a descent in the rear of the Russian army, rendered the position of the latter most critical. Sprengtporten never wearied of representing the convocation of the Diet as the only way out of the difficulty. The situation was such, that the Emperor resolved to take a step which he had hitherto avoided, i. e. to address himself personally to the Inhabitants of Finland, by means of a declaration issued in his name. The result of this resolution was the manifesto of June $\frac{1}{17}$ 1808 which was principally intended to

convince the Finns of the Emperor's immutable intention of uniting Finland to the Russian Empire, in spite of the difficulties and sacrifices the undertaking might imply. But it also contained an assurance to maintain „old laws and privileges“. Nor was this all, for soon after a command was issued to Finland that deputies from the four Estates were to be sent to St. Petersburg, in order to inform the Emperor of the wants and wishes of the country.

M. Ordin's description of these events is, as we said, diffuse, and contains several hitherto unknown details. But the author very seldom refers to former researches or quotes authorities, therefore the reader is easily led to believe that the new facts he is informed of are much more numerous and weighty than is really the case. Several of the most important among Sprengtporten's letters are for instance already published in the appendices to R. Castrén's „Narrative of the Modern History of Finland, Helsingfors 1882“. His opponent Klick's memorials to the emperor, and to Rumyantsoff as well as other political essays of his from 1808 were for the first time published in the journal of the Finnish Historical Society „Historiallinen Arkisto“, T. X. If M. Ordin had consulted this he would have found several notes and memorials, of which the Russian archives possess no copies, among others Klick's diary of a journey to Finland in March and April of 1808, during which, as an emissary of the Russian Government, he began

a correspondence, which helped to prepare the way for the fall of Sveaborg¹.

M. Ordin naturally never forgets his desire to paint the Finns, in opposition to his own country-men, as inveterately false and treacherous, nor to represent the present political position of Finland as a consequence of intrigues and trickery. This desire leads him to exaggerations, which have sometimes a most comical effect. Here belongs his argument concerning a supposed difference between the Russian and the Swedish formulas of the oath which, in accordance with Klick's proposition, was to be demanded of the Finnish people. According to both texts the oath of allegiance is taken to: „His Imperial Majesty - - the Emperor Alexander Pavlovitch“, but in the Russian text the Emperor is further called Государь (Lord or Sovereign) and the difference lies, according to M. Ordin, in the translation of this word into the Swedish „prince“. „The deviation is small, but not without importance“, he reasons, „for here we find the first, hardly visible seed of Finland's future separate position“. (Ordin II, 88). He pretends to know Swedish, but believes nevertheless that the word „prince“ has no other significance than that of a ruler over a Duchy. If his

¹ We may note here that the letter of Buxhoevden to Count Saltikoff, concerning the capitulation of Sveaborg, which is reprinted by M. Ordin among his appendices, (II 25—27) was published in Russian as well as in a Finnish translation in the Finnish periodical „Valvoja“ in the Sept. number of 1883.

knowledge of the language were a little less superficial it might have occurred to him that the word „prince“ can be used in reference to any Sovereign, whether he be an Emperor, a King, or anything else. The difference between the Russian and Swedish text is altogether fictitious. The translation was moreover done at the Russian headquarters, and consequently not under the superintendence of Sprengtporten. Yet the author attributes to the desire of the Finns for independence the introduction into the Swedish text of the offending word.

The correspondence between Count Buxhoevden and the Finnish Authorities is one of the most reliable sources of information of the attitude that the Finnish people, and especially the body of officials, occupied in reference to the mandates of the Commander-in-Chief. The publication of this correspondence, by the Finnish Historical Society, having only just begun, and M. Ordin not having cared to make studies at the Finnish State Archives, his exposition is also here faulty and misleading to a degree. In opposition to the Finnish authors who maintain that the people were compelled by force and by threats, to take the oath of fealty, which therefore, was of comparatively small importance, M. Ordin declares point blank that no forcible means were used. (II, 124, 187). In order to determine whether this be a true statement or not, it is necessary to read for instance Buxhoevden's communications to the Governor of the province of

Abo, Knut von Troil, on May $\frac{1}{20}$ and to the Abo and Vasa Court of Appeal two days later. Troil was curtly informed, that, if he wished to remain in office and to provide for the safety of his life and property, he must immediately take the oath of fealty and make arrangements for the inhabitants of the province to do the same. In the communication to the Court of Appeal the same threat is ironically expressed: „If, contrary to my expectation, some farmer or cultivator of the soil should not care for the safety of his life and property he is naturally exempt from the duty of taking the oath, but his name must be put down, for my information, in the protocols, which the district judges send in to the Imperial Court of Appeal at Abo (Vasa)“. By these outrageous threats, then, was the command of taking the oath accompanied, and history informs us of instances where they were ruthlessly put into execution. We will remind our readers of one only of these sad cases. Because of his refusal to take the oath a minister of the Gospel, an old man of 74 years, Jakob Chydenius, was submitted to ill-usage, in consequence of which he died. The people naturally took the oath, wherever the Russian arms were strong enough to enforce the command, but it is equally well known that the bitterness caused by this violation of conscience was one of the chief causes of the general risings and revolts which in the summer of 1808 threatened the rear and the flanks of the Russian army. M. Ordin not only shuts his eyes to

these facts, but moreover makes the very extraordinary assertion, that „the incorporation of Finland with the Russian Empire was accomplished by the taking of the oath“ (II, 125). How does he explain the numerous battles, the passionate struggle for the possession of the country which was continued during the summer and autumn of 1808? How does he explain that the oath of fealty, when first wrung from the people during the wars and occupation of 1714—1721 and 1742—1743 did not „accomplish“ this fusion? Or, to take an example in another direction, how was it that the incorporation of East-Prussia with all the Russias was not accomplished when in 1758, during the Seven Years' War, the inhabitants of Königsberg and the surrounding district were forced to take the oath of allegiance to the Empress Elisabeth?

M. Ordin attributes to an implacable national hatred of Russia the tenacity with which the greater part of the population clung to the union with Sweden. This hatred, he informs us, (O. II, 4) was encouraged by the „Abo News“ — the little paper which hardly took any notice at all of politics and which moreover, because written in Swedish, was inaccessible to § of the people. Buxhoevden was of a different opinion. According to him the attachment of the people to their old Government was attributable „to a national quality, which is in its way rather praiseworthy“ (Buxhoevden's report of June 7 o. s. 1808.)

M. Ordin carefully ignores this and every expression of sympathy for the Finnish people in Buxhoevden's Correspondence with the Russian Government. Thus he for instance quotes the report which the Commander sent to the Emperor on March 12/24, after the entrance into Abo, but takes good care not to insert a word of the description the Commander here gives of Finland and its people. The following extract will give an idea of the Russian General's opinion of Finland: „The inhabitants are particularly clean and tidy, their manners are good and refined, they possess an education fully equal to that in the best provinces of Germany. The farther we penetrate westward from the Russian frontier, the more these peculiarities strike us. In spite of the lack of bread they do not consider themselves poor, their judicious economy making up for all that nature and the climate have denied them.“

Instead of the Diet, the convocation of which the Emperor had deferred, a deputation, composed of members of the four Estates was, as we know, summoned to St. Petersburg. Definite instructions concerning the number of delegates, and the manner of their election were left to the discretion of Buxhoevden, though the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a letter to the former, expressed an opinion that the members ought to be elected in the same way as used to be the case with the representatives sent to Stockholm. Buxhoevden

only partly followed this advice. The deputation, such as he commanded it to be elected, resembled in many ways former Diets, but the fundamental law concerning the construction of these was in several points set aside. This mode of conducting matters and the uncertainty in the minds of people whether the deputation was to be considered a legally appointed assembly of representatives, caused protests to be made and the elections to be partially postponed until the Commander-in-Chief had formally explained that „there was now no question of convoking a Diet, but of sending a deputation most humbly to advise His Majesty of what, in the present position of the country, might be of benefit and promote its welfare.“

M. Ordin's account of the origin of the deputation is principally based on a work by Robert Castrén, „Finska Deputationen“, published in Helsingfors in 1879. The hateful colours in which he persistently paints the Finnish nation are naturally wholly of his own invention.

The attack is first directed against Finland's first historian, Yrjö-Koskinen, for in his Finnish history — i. e. in the German translation thereof — M. Ordin has discovered the word deputation translated into *Gesandtschaft* (Embassy). The expression is obviously incorrect, but as M. Ordin employs it over and over again (II, 146, 165, 168) in order to prove that the Finnish authors, deviating from the truth, try to invest the deputation with quite a wrong character, even

the most ordinary amount of conscientiousness would have induced him to investigate whether the misleading word belong to the author himself, or only to his German translator. He would then have discovered that M. Yrjö-Koskinen, in his Finnish original, alternately uses the word deputation and its Finnish synonym „lähetyskunta“. In the Swedish translation the word „deputation“ only is used. What then remains of Ordin's ironical exclamation about an Embassy from an unknown Power?

The opposition with which the command to send a deputation to the Russian capital at first met makes M. Ordin mightily wroth. The fact, that the farther you look westward, the more intense is the demand of the people for the observance of legal forms, is by Castrén attributed to the greater political maturity and love of liberty among the population. M. Ordin thinks differently, he exclaims sneeringly: „Would it not be more consistent with truth if we attributed it to the political licentiousness and extravagance of the Swedish Nobles, which are a growth of centuries“. (II, 169). Just before giving this account of the Swedish Nobles, M. Ordin (II, 167) mentions among the leaders of the opposition Vibelius the Governor of Kuopio and Professor Calonius. Hence his intention must have been to point out these as specimens of political licentiousness and aristocratic arbitrariness.

M. Ordin forgets that he in another place, (II, 142) not without according it some praise, gives an extract

from the printed programme wherein Calonius (the greatest jurist of his time in Sweden and Finland), as Rector of the University of Abo, pronounced his opinion of the relations of subjects to their lawful Sovereign, and this at a time when the Russians were in possession of the town, and when they had even forced its population to take the oath of fealty. In order to enable our readers to form an unbiassed opinion of the views of the men who in a way were at the head of the Finnish „opposition“, we will insert an extract from this programme. After having recognised the humane treatment during the war of the Finnish people by the army, and more especially by its Commander, Calonius continues:

„But though we have been well and kindly treated, yet there have remained many circumstances which in our present uncertain position, cause us anxiety and oppress us with a burden of cares. For in every wisely and well established community, there exists between the Sovereign and his subject a delightful bond, consisting of a hundred separate threads, which connects them closely in mutual love and mutual duties. It is next to impossible that this strong and wonderful bond should be so severed at the first stroke of misfortune as not to leave, in the subject's soul, a sense of grief at the sudden change and a wish and longing to return to the old circumstances. The fortunes of war may have given our bodies into the hands of the foe and thus compelled us to obey the commands

enforced by his powerful arms, but our souls, less dependent on fortune's changes and on outward events, continue the same as before, with unfailing faith and steadfast obedience bound to their lawful King. For, as long as the issue of the war is undetermined, and as long as there exists no treaty in which the King himself renounces his rights, the subject is not at liberty to shake off his duties as such and to loosen the bonds which bind him, as well as his country, to its ruler, unless he be willing to soil his soul with the infamous crime! of high-treason“.

Thus Calonius. The letter with which the Governor of Kuopio, Vibelius, answered the orders of Count Buxhoevden that the wives and children of Finnish officers, who did not within a certain time forsake the Swedish Standard, were to be driven from their holdings¹ M. Ordin considers unauthorised and „groundless.“ He does not insert any extract from this letter, therefore we give it in full. The original, written in Swedish, is kept at the State archives in Helsingfors.

A most humble memorial.

Your Excellency has in an order of the 2:nd instant commanded that if, contrary to your expectation, any officer of the Finnish army were to accompany the Swedish army across the frontiers of the conquered country and omit to signify his presence to the Governor of the province within $\frac{\text{April } 25}{\text{May } 11}$ (sic) of this year,

¹ Land adjoined to a military fee.

then, in accordance with the proclamation of $\frac{\text{March } 21}{\text{April } 2}$:
 1) his salary will be immediately forfeited to the Emperor, and 2) all his property confiscated; wherefore it would rest with me, in such cases, after a duly made inventory to publish notices as to the letting of their holdings, appointments and property.

I know not of the above mentioned proclamation, but Your Excellency has publicly, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, confirmed and secured the maintenance of the laws of this country, and has enjoined me to accord the protection of the law to all the inhabitants of the province who do not take active part in the military operations. In consequence thereof I am constrained to inform Your Excellency that our law bids that no man's rights be forfeited by another, neither the wife's by her husband, nor the creditor's by the debtor. Chapter XI § 4 of the Marriage Act determines that everybody must pay the penalty of his own wrong doing.

Even if the officers of the Finnish army, engaged in the performance of their duty, should have forfeited their property, because of a crime before unknown to them; yet it is against the law, that their wives and their creditors should therefore lose the rights that are their due. The confiscation and advertising for lease, which has been laid upon me, fills the whole country with dismay and despair.

I appeal to Your Excellency's righteous generosity and noble spirit for the innocent individuals of the

Finnish nation whose misery would be great if this order were executed.

Your Excellency, well versed in the laws of honour, having by the observance of such laws won fame and glory, surely would not think highly of a nation that did not know how to esteem honour, duty and virtue.

My duty is to guard the peace and to ensure to everyone the protection of the law, and that I will do to the best of my abilities, like an honourable man, as long as the power is left to me; the consciousness of having done my duty will support me in misfortune, follow me to the beggar's cottage or to the grave, worn out and tired after more than thirty years' office, in my old age bent low by sorrow and care, I shall yet leave this world with a calm and peaceful mind. Kuopio, April 14, 1808.

Vibelius.

Such are the acts in which M. Ordin is unable to find anything but opposition against Russia — and political licentiousness. They need no comment. The moral courage, the loyalty to their lawful Sovereign, the firm adherence to law and right, which pervade every line of these documents have made Calonius and Vibelius „national heroes,“ an honour which in spite of M. Ordin's assertion to the contrary has never been and will never be conferred upon Sprengtporten. From generation to generation the Finnish people have under altered circumstances faithfully and con-

scientiously followed the example that the venerable old men of 1808 set them, and surely they will continue to do so still, in spite of unceasing provocations from a certain party in Russia.'

We now return to the opposition against the election of delegates. According to M. Ordin, the demand of the Finnish electors that, in accordance with the Emperor's promise to maintain the laws, the fundamental law concerning the election of representatives should be adhered to, was a ridiculous comedy. With the reasons for delay given by the Nobles of the province of Abo and Björneborg he naturally finds fault. He says: „The members of the Estate of Nobles understood full well, that even from their point of view, there could be no question here of violating the law, nor was there any question of convoking a Diet but of an accidental deputation only“ (II, 171). He forgets here, what he a short while before admitted (II, 166), that the Russian Government, by using indefinite expressions, unintentionally caused misunderstandings. A glance at the communication of Buxhoevden to the Governors in Abo, Vasa, Tavastehus and Heinola, in which he ordered the elections to be performed, proves that this was the case to a much greater extent, than M. Ordin seems to be aware of. According to the instructions, it was by no means only „Finnish experts“, with an accurate knowledge of the country and its wants, who were to be returned, but there was to be an election of „delegates from all the Estates“.

Buxhoevden calls those to be elected „the delegates of the Estates“ instead of speaking of them as private individuals, chosen from the different Estates. He commands „those members of the Estates who elect delegates, properly to provide them with such instructions as may correspond with the wishes of the Estates“ — just as was the custom at the election of Representatives for the Diet. In his first command moreover, the Russian General, giving a motive for not convoking all the electors, does not by any means say that there was then no question of a regular Diet, but only attributes this omission to his wish to „avoid the great cost, and the loss of time and other unforeseen circumstances which might arise in consequence of the war, if all the members of the Estates were asked to meet“.¹ All this naturally produced an apprehension that the Russian Government intended to confer upon the deputation the dignity of a lawful assembly of representatives of the nation, and to give its utterances the value and significance of formal decisions of the Diet. Under these circumstances it was natural that the handful of electors Buxhoevden had called together, hesitated to proceed to the performance of an election, the consequences of which they could not foresee. The

¹ Compare Buxhoevdens letter of $\frac{\text{June } 19}{\text{July } 1}$ to the Governors, published in the appendices of Castrén's work „the Finnish Deputation“. Buxhoevden's letter to the Chapters in Abo and Borgo, dated $\frac{22 \text{ June}}{4 \text{ July}}$ contains nearly the same thing.

members of the Order of Nobility, summoned to meet in Abo, declared that they would consider themselves „wanting no less in humble confidence in His Imperial Majesty's most solemn and precious assurance to confirm the liberties and rights of each Estate, than in the duty we owe to the other members of our Order, as well as to ourselves, if we dared not candidly confess the scruples and misgivings the manner of performing this election has engendered within us“.

M. Ordin maintains that this firm adherence to the laws was not, by any means, the sole motive of their opposition. They did, indeed, have another, but one that no honourable man ought to disapprove of. This motive was a wish to have no more communication with the enemy than was absolutely necessary, as long as the issue of the war was undetermined. Let us not forget that the electors were called together at the end of July and in the first days of August, that is at a time when the Finnish army was in possession of two thirds of Swedish Finland, and when, to quote M. Ordin, „it was natural to suppose that also the remaining parts might be delivered from the Russian power“ (II, 172). Would it have been consistent with the duties of subjects and with political morals, if the electors had been immediately prepared and willing to send to St. Petersburg a deputation, which, whatever character and significance was attributed to it, would always be considered a proof of Finland's definite submission? Even M. Ordin, when

speaking of the unwillingness of the deputies to depart, cannot quite free himself from looking at the matter in this light (II, 186), but none the less he attributes the opposition and delay to political defects, and, continuing in the same strain, he denounces the „insolence“ of the Finnish Nobles, (II, 172) and the „brazen, systematic“ resistance of the Finns (II, 176).

As soon as Buxhoevden, while reiterating his order, declared that there was now no question of convoking a Diet, even the electors of those corporations whose opposition had been most strenuous, proceeded, as we know, to choose delegates. In consequence of the journey of the Emperor to Germany, where the celebrated meeting with Napoleon took place at Erfurt, the arrival of the delegates was put off and, even after the greater part were assembled in St. Petersburg towards the end of October, a whole month passed before they were received in audience by the Emperor, on November 18. During the weeks after Alexander's return from Germany, and the arrival of the deputation, the question of the future position of Finland was the object of Alexander's and his advisers' frequent deliberations. Dissatisfied with the line of conduct Buxhoevden had of late adopted at the seat of war, Alexander resolved to remove him, and renewed his offer to Sprengtporten to superintend the civil administration of Finland as its Governor-General. When this offer was first made

to him, immediately after the commencement of the war he refrained from accepting it then, partly because the conquest of the country was hardly begun, partly because he feared there would arise differences between him and the Commander-in-Chief. The conquest being nearly achieved, and Buxhoevden recalled, Sprengtporten was now prepared to accept the office. Before giving a definite answer, however, he thought it his duty to submit to His Majesty's consideration his opinions concerning the management of Finnish affairs. He gives this expression to the principles he maintained: „La Finlande est à peu près conquise par le succès de vos armes, Sire. Il reste à conquérir les coeurs de ses habitants, qui nous sont plus que jamais aliénés; ce n'est que par une administration équitable et juste, conforme à leur ancienne constitution, propre à cicatriser les plaies profondes que les opérations passées y ont laissées après elles, que cette conquête si nécessaire aux succès ultérieurs de vos armes peut s'effectuer“. He again repeats the suggestion which he has so often made, of convoking a lawful Diet — „une assemblée générale et constitutionnelle“ — where the Emperor should be present, as the only method of gaining the confidence of the people. The deputation, though the manner of its election was unlawful, „toute illégale qu'elle est quant à son élection qui s'est faite au préjudice des lois“, might furnish important information, but it would very imperfectly answer the principal purpose or ultimate aim that was contemplated. The most

important suggestion in the memorial of Sprengtporten was that of introducing a temporary government in Finland — „une régence provisoire“ — with Finnish members and the Governor-General at its head. These general views won the consent of the Emperor, as well as the detailed plan on the government of the country, which Sprengtporten soon after submitted to the Emperor and which was sanctioned by him, after it had been examined and in all essential parts approved of by a committee, whose members were, besides Sprengtporten, the Minister of war, Count Araktcheyeff, and General von Knorring, who was to succeed Buxhoevden as Commander-in-Chief. The document was to be considered an instruction for the new Governor-General, and contained what he had in the first place stipulated for: the condition that a lawful Diet was to assemble in the beginning of the following year.

On the day, $\frac{\text{Nov. } 19}{\text{Dec. } 1}$, that the Emperor signed this resolution the deputation, after having on the day before, been received in audience by the Monarch, presented to the Minister for Foreign affairs, Count Saltikoff, its first memorial, in which the manner of its election and the limited competence which it in consequence thereof possessed, were candidly put forth. The memorial was addressed to the Emperor and began with expressions of gratitude, because all the inhabitants of Finland had been „solemnly assured by His Majesty of the maintenance of their religion, laws, liberties and rights“. After quoting the law paragraphs

which made it impossible for the members of the deputation to consider themselves as representatives of the Finnish people the memorial continued: „The delegates, assured of His Majesty's gracious kindness, having humbly ventured to state the difficulties which seemed to them to stand in the way of the fulfilment of the purpose for which they were called together consider, that not being the representatives of the whole people, they cannot enter into deliberations belonging to the Estates, when convoked in the usual and lawful manner. But if it would please Your Majesty to request information concerning the economical circumstances of Finland we will comply with Your Majesty's gracious request to the best of our abilities, most humbly committing to Your Majesty's consideration the necessity of a general Diet, in order to learn the opinion of the nation on subjects concerning every body's welfare and the general good“. This memorial was answered by a letter from the newly appointed Governor-General, dated $\frac{\text{Nov. } 29}{\text{Dec. } 11}$ containing the declaration that the Emperor perceived that the deputation, „could not, as completely as he had wished and intended, resport to his paternal care“, wherefore he had decided as soon as possible to convoke a general Diet as a pledge of his tender solicitude and care for the continued existence of your laws“. „The Emperor, however, expecting from you full information on the present state of the country, oppressed as it is by the heavy burden of a long war, which burden he intends

as far as possible to relieve, it is His gracious will that the deputation should immediately state the subjects on which they would solicit His Majesty's gracious help and assistance on behalf of his new subjects".

In obedience to this command, the deputation in a second memorial recommended several measures, which would facilitate a return to order. The Imperial resolution on this petition, signed Jan. 1st 1809, was most graciously worded and also contained a repetition of the promise to convoke the Estates. Then the deputation was sent home. At this time all matters concerning Finland, after having been hitherto reported to the Emperor by different persons, were left to the Secretary of State, Michael Speransky, who shortly afterwards received as assistant a Finnish gentleman, Baron, later Count R. H. Rehbinder.

For his account of the deputation in St. Petersburg and of events connected with it M. Ordin was in possession of very valuable material in the archives. But nearly all the most important of these had been known and made use of in Finland, before the appearance of M. Ordin's book. Especially concerning the doings of the deputation itself his work contains nothing, except a few notes, but what Castrén informs us of in his account. On the other hand Sprengtporten's memorials from this time, and the opinions of the Russian Statesmen concerning them, were unknown to Castrén, when he wrote his treatise; later on the

greater part of these documents have been either inserted in full or largely quoted by Yrjö-Koskinen, as well as by Tigerstedt in his biography of Sprengtporten, the contents of which M. Ordin, as we know full well, has completely disregarded. Yet there remains even in this part so much that is new and interesting that the account, if it were made *sine ira et studio* would be a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the history of that time. In its present state it is a caricature of the qualities one demands in a historical work.

The deputation is to M. Ordin a real bugbear, whose stay in the Russian capital inflicted boundless injury to the interests of the Empire. The president only of the deputation played a visible part, its members were quite insignificant, says M. Ordin, and then exclaims: „And these commonplace people were able to drive the Russian Government from the right and natural road it had determined to take. By whom, then, were the attacks of those, not very clever, but well disciplined men met?“ Count Rumyantsof, the only one among the Russian Statesmen of that time who finds favour with M. Ordin, had continued his journey from Erfurt to Paris and had not yet returned. „The other leading personages: Araktcheyeff, Saltikoff and even Knorring — — — were feeble warriors, incapable of breaking through the dense lines of the deputies“. There yet remained Speransky, who soon won great influence over the Finnish affairs. Unfor-

tunately he was imbued with European constitutional ideas, and considered Finland a convenient field for his experiments, possibly also as a suitable model. Thus there was no one capable of taking care of and guarding „Russia's real interests“ (O. II, 192—193).

Poor, Speransky! And what a wretched situation for Araktcheyeff, Saltikoff, Knorring and the other „feeble warriors“ who were, in the very capital, exposed to the fearful attacks of a handful of otherwise peaceable Finnish noblemen, priests, burgesses and peasants! But perhaps the situation was not, after all, so very dangerous. Anyhow the author seems to have, later on, quite a different opinion of the importance of the deputation.

The only achievement of the deputation that may have been of importance was the refusal to perform the part of an assembly of representatives, which was contained in its first memorial. M. Ordín says about this document, „that it had not the slightest significance“ (II, 218) and repeats his opinion that the resolution of the Emperor to convoke a Diet was quite independent of the refusal of the deputies to consider themselves representatives of the Finnish people. In order to impress upon the reader this opinion he adds (II, 221): „the memorial was not considered to be of greater importance, than the generality of such documents — which are not taken into consideration“. Can the reader help asking himself, wonderingly, what the great work of the deputation was, which had so baneful

an influence on Russia, and what the attack was, that forced Araktcheyeff, Saltikoff, Knorring and others ignominiously to lay down their arms. The answer is the author's secret, and he does not choose to reveal it. He begins by attributing to the work of the deputation the most fatal effect on the political interests of Russia, but when he comes to discuss the separate items of this work, he divests it of every significance.

M. Ordin considers the resolution of the Emperor to convoke a Diet as exclusively Sprengtporten's work, the deputation had no part whatever in it. This point also contains a polemic against „the Finnish authors“, yet he ought to know that there have been different opinions among them on the subject, for Yrjö-Koskinen, in opposition to Castrén, maintained that, after the Emperor, it is to Sprengtporten we owe the convocation of the Diet. The difference, however, between Yrjö-Koskinen and M. Ordin is very great, in so far that the latter altogether misses the mark, by protesting that the summons to the representatives was in no way a consequence of the conduct of the deputation. It is certainly possible that the Emperor had already formed his resolution to convoke a Diet when the memorial of the deputation was reported to him, but anyhow its essence, the refusal of the delegates to act as representatives of the people, must before then have been known to the Russian Government. In this very refusal Sprengtporten found his strongest support when he asked for the convocation of a lawful Diet.

If the deputation had acquitted themselves differently, accepting without a protest the part assigned to them, it is more than probable, that the thought of convoking a Finnish Diet would have been abandoned, no one can tell for how long.

Concerning the maintenance of the laws of Finland, the opinions of Sprengtporten perfectly agreed with those of the deputation, but on other subjects there was not at first the complete harmony between them, that M. Ordin seems to suppose. According to him, they both laboured for the immediate convocation of a Diet. It is true, that this was the case with Sprengtporten but the deputation, on the other hand, with the greater part of the electors, wished that the Diet should be put off till peace had been concluded. This is quite evident e. g. from the memorandum that the President of the deputation, Baron Mannerheim, at the first meeting, added to the protocol and which formed a basis for their future conduct. This memorandum contains these words: „Until peace be re-established, it is impossible to take any but temporary measures, decided on by those that are in possession of the country, though they lack the voluntary consent of the people“. (Castrén, „Finska deputationen“, p. 52) In accordance with this disposition for delay, the demand for the convocation of a Diet in the memorial to the Emperor is so expressed, that it is impossible to understand whether the deputation desired it to be summoned before the termination of the war or not. It was

not till later on when the resolution of the Emperor was known and imparted to the deputation, that Mannerheim, in a private note to Count Saltikoff, spoke of the Diet as of immediate necessity, in consequence of the circumstances in which the country was situated.

It is not difficult to understand the motives of the deputies in desiring a postponement of the convocation of a Diet. They agreed with professor Calonius in the opinions he had expressed in his strong and powerful language, that as long as peace was not concluded — and in spite of the enemy being in possession of the country — the subjects were not at liberty to shirk their duties towards their lawful Sovereign. By degrees, however, the deputation, as well as Calonius, were persuaded that this axiom, though in a general sense right and most commendable, yet cannot under all circumstances be adhered to. The pressure of circumstances taught them at last, that after the Finnish people had spent their strength in an uneven struggle for the maintenance of their Union with Sweden and the re-establishment of this Union seemed impossible, they could, with a good conscience and unstained honour, obey their instinct of selfpreservation, and make their future existence secure by means of a loyal settlement with the conqueror.

We repeat it once more. The convocation of a Diet *during the war*, was originally the plan of Sprengt-

porten alone, not that of the deputation.¹ In spite of his talk of the great influence of Sprengtporten it is evident that M. Ordin does not understand or appreciate its great importance in this matter. Speaking for instance of the first meeting of the deputation, he says that Mannerheim and the majority were of opinion, that all temporary measures even ought to be referred to the Diet (II, 209). We know, however, that Mannerheim, in the memorandum which was approved by the deputation, quite on the contrary pronounces the opinion, that all temporary measures which the war necessitated, depended solely on the conqueror, and might be taken by him, independent of the representatives.

M. Ordin's comments on the refusal of the deputation to act as the lawfully elected representatives of the Finnish people are no less misleading; Let us quote his words: „On the Emperor's table lay the memorandum of the deputation, brought by Saltikoff and reported by him; in this memorandum Mannerheim and his colleagues most decidedly refuse to discuss any alterations because they cannot consider themselves legally

¹ Mannerheim confirms this fact in words, quoted by Castrén in another place, but taken no further notice of. In his memoirs the ex-president of the deputation explains, that he considered the convocation of the Diet too early, because according to his opinion, „as long as the war lasted and until the country was ceded to the conqueror by treaty, there was not much to be done for its altered organisation and future existence“, Castrén, Skildringar p. 131.

entitled to do so. Yet the Emperor peremptorily commands them to pronounce their opinion concerning the improvements and reforms, consequently also changes, that were necessary for the country" (Ordin II, 221). In truth the matter stands differently. In the memorandum that lay on the Emperor's table — if it lay there, for it has never been proved that Saltikoff had reported it to His Majesty before December 1:st — there was the above already mentioned declaration: „But if it would please Your Imperial Majesty to desire information concerning the economical circumstances of Finland, we will comply with Your Majesty's gracious request to the best of our abilities“. At the first meeting of the deputation Mannerheim had pronounced much the same sentiments. „If it pleased His Majesty so to command“, the deputies „would offer their humble advice concerning ways and means of alleviating during the war the burdens, which are the inevitable consequences of such calamities“. Hence it was not, as M. Ordin tries to make out, in spite of the protests of the deputation, but in accordance with their definite proposal that the Emperor, in the answer he delivered through Sprengtporten, while promising to convoke a Diet, commanded the deputation to mention the matters in which they wished that „his goodness should come to the assistance of his new subjects“.

M. Ordin inserts the memorandum of the deputation in full, an attentive reader will therefore easily, with-

out reference to Finnish or Swedish authors, be able to detect these inaccuracies. This is not the case, however, with his assertion, (II, 216—217) that the Finnish historians Yrjö-Koskinen and Castrén had made their readers acquainted only with certain passages in the memorandum, suitable for their purposes. „It is natural“, he says, „that this document could not be placed before the reader in full as a proof of the existence of an agreement, still less of a treaty“, between the Emperor and the Finlanders. The reader will judge how far this accusation is justifiable, when he learns that Castrén for instance, though carefully reporting the memorandum, yet reproduces it among his appendices in its Swedish as well as in its French text. (Castrén, Finska deputationen pp 62—63 and 67—68).

Possibly this last wrong statement may be the consequence of a mistake caused by his ignorance of these appendices and the protocols of the deputation that are published among them. For it is evident that he has taken no notice of the protocols. He is altogether ignorant e. g. of the Emperor's answer to the first communication of the deputation, though it is inserted in the protocol of $\frac{\text{Nov. 29}}{\text{Dec. 11}}$ and its contents are reported in Castrén's book, page 58. This inadvertency is the cause of many mistakes. He thinks that the definite promise of a Diet was not formally made until January 1809, and believes, in consequence of a note by Sprengtporten, that the Emperor enjoined

the deputation to answer certain definite questions. We know already that this was not the case, but that the Imperial answer on the contrary left to the deputation to decide what measures they wanted to propose for the benefit of their countrymen.

With the knowledge the reader has already acquired of the bent of M. Ordin's mind, as displayed in this work, he will not be surprised to hear that the author represents the members of the deputation, as well as other Finns appearing in his work, as acting, all through, from more or less selfish motives. In the pursuit of this object he makes more than one contradictory statement, but that is a matter of no importance whatever to this historian.

We will mention one instance only. M. Ordin considers the conduct of the deputation, as well as earlier that of the electors, as an outcome of the intrigues of the Nobles, and informs his readers that the Finnish Nobility hoped for a re-establishment, under Russian Government, of the class power it lost through the revolution brought about by Gustavus III in 1772 (O. II, 206). Soon after the author has to explain the fact, that the deputation, as well as Sprengtporten, resolutely demanded that the Swedish-Finnish Constitution should be maintained such as it was after the alterations in 1772 and in 1789. Nothing daunted, he gets rid of the difficulty by declaring that with this Constitution the Nobility might easily enrich themselves at the cost of the State, while the other classes, more espe-

cially the peasants, were ruined (II, 230). Hence, according to the first accusation, the deputation, guided by narrow class interests, should have aimed at a return to the Constitution of the „time of liberty;“ later on the deputation is accused of having worked, with the same object in view, for the maintenance of the Constitution of 1772 and 1789. We need not be endowed with over much common sense in order to be struck by this glaring contradiction, but however much M. Ordin's logic may be at fault, his ill-will is not wanting.

More than anything else the talk of confirmed laws and of an inviolable Constitution puts M. Ordin into a passion. We fear the reader has had more than enough of quotations from this book, but the peculiar circumstances under which it appeared compel us to proceed.

In consequence of Sprengtporten's proposal to establish a separate Government in Finland, and with reference to the fact, that the Government in Stockholm was the model after which he moulded his ideas, M. Ordin remarks: „The logical consequence was, that this Government ought to have had its seat in St. Petersburg, though its work encompassed only one province. This would have been the more reasonable that there existed already in St. Petersburg a Senate, forming the highest appeal for judicial and other cases, not only from Russia proper, but also from the Baltic Provinces, which had also formerly been

subjected to the Swedish Government and whose position had therefore been similar to that of Finland". (II, 232). We should much like to believe, that this comparison between Finland and the Baltic Provinces was really made *bona fide*. But then we must at least suppose that he has altogether forgotten a fact he duly mentioned in the first part of his work (I, 53), that the provinces south of the Gulf of Finland did not possess the right of sending representatives to the Swedish Diets. The Baltic Provinces never possessed the same political rights as Sweden proper. They were dependencies of Sweden, and were not governed according to the statutes of the Swedish Constitution, but according to the will and pleasure of the Swedish kings, which were only slightly limited by certain „capitulations“ containing privileges especially for the Nobility ratified on the conquest of the country. Neither this Estate nor the other inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces had any share in the political rights of the Swedish people. They had neither seats in the Swedish Diets nor could they hold offices, which the law reserved for Swedish citizens by birth. In some particular cases exceptions were made, by means of so called „special privileges“, but the exceptions only confirm the rule.

In all these things Finland's relation to Sweden was altogether different. During the Middle Ages, when Sweden was an elective Monarchy, the Finns were, according to law, entitled to take part in the

election of Kings; and later on the Finnish Estates sent representatives to the Diets in Sweden, when for some reason or other alterations were made in the Succession. There existed no difference between Finn and Swede, either in the execution of this, the highest expression of political power, or concerning other functions, such as the right of legislation and of taxation. The laws sometimes mention both nations side by side¹, and always on terms of equality; but generally the expression „a Swedish man“ was considered extensive enough to include every man in enjoyment of all the rights of a citizen of the Monarchy, whether born of a Swedish or of a Finnish father. Sweden and Finland together, as opposed to the transmarine possessions east and south of the Baltic, formed the ruling and governing part of the country, which fact appears e. g. by the title of the famous work by the Swede Michael Vexonius, „*Epitome descriptionis Sueciae, Gothiae, Fenningiae et subjectarum provinciarum*“.

— It is then evident that the conclusions concerning the relations of Finland to the Russian Empire, which M. Ordin draws from the supposed likeness between

¹ There are numerous instances of this fact especially from the time of Gustavus III and also from that of the reign of Gustavus I Adolphus. Compare, for instance, the summons to the Diet of 1789, and the assurance and ratification of the rights and liberties of the Swedish and Finnish peasantry, Feb. 23 and April 4 1789.

the early relations of Finland and the Baltic provinces to Sweden, must appear to us as resting on a total misapprehension of facts.

We now return to Sprengtporten's proposal of establishing a temporary Government for Finland. We have already mentioned, that it was sanctioned by the Emperor in the form it received in the committee which was specially appointed for its examination. The Emperor deviated from the committee in one point only, and this point was the proposal, that Finnish affairs should be reported to the Emperor by the Russian Ministers, and that the Monarch's commands should in the same way be communicated to the Governor-General. The Emperor directed that the Governor-General should report to himself, not to his Ministers. This was undoubtedly a change of great significance, because it clearly shewed the Emperor's intention of separating Finnish affairs from Russian. In accusing us Finns of seeking a support for the theory of a personal-union with Russia in this resolution of the Emperor, M. Ordin is guilty of no less a thing than a downright falsehood. No historian or political writer in Finland has been known to propound this theory, which would indeed be absolutely false. M. Ordin mentions Yrjö-Koskinen and asserts that he published the proposal for the establishment of a temporary Government for Finland, which was confirmed and sanctioned by the Emperor, at the head of a collection of documents „Correspondance officielle de

G. M. Sprengtporten“, „with that end in view“, that is as a proof of his opinion that the two countries are united, only through a personal-union (II, 248). In the preface to this publication, Yrjö-Koskinen explains the cause of his inserting this document, together with the decree which nominated Sprengtporten to the office of Governor-General, in the following words: „Nous faisons précéder les lettres du gouverneur général Sprengtporten de deux documents qui constituent comme la base du nouvel état du pays“. That is all. He does not even mention the personal-union, or refer to the resolution of the Emperor to have the Finnish affairs reported, not to his Ministers, but to himself.

M. Ordin would probably make the objection that Yrjö-Koskinen, in this same preface, calls Finland a separate State, „état séparé“, for he finds fault with this expression already in the preface of his own work. It is possible that the expression, when standing alone, might be misunderstood by those who very much want to do so, but it is certainly applicable to States that are in real union with other Monarchies, and even to dependencies, possessing a Government and Constitution of their own.¹ There is at all events an enormous

¹ Yrjö-Koskinen uses the expression „état séparé“, he does not say „état indépendant“. There is a corresponding expression used by Gradoffski, formerly professor at the University of St. Petersburg, in a work published in 1875, „the foundations of Russian public law“, § 108 where he declares that Finland, as far as its internal Government is concerned forms a completely separate

difference between this expression and the words personal-union, and M. Ordin's accusation is and remains groundless and false.

The author here gives another proof of the distortion of facts he allows himself, but in spite of this and of all that has gone before we must confess to having been astounded at his statements concerning Count R. H. Rehbinder.

At the time of Finland's Union with the Russian Empire this Statesman — born in 1777— was still young. He was not a member of the deputation which consisted of delegates from the 4 Estates, but arrived in St. Petersburg at Christmas 1808, as a special delegate from the Court of Appeal at Abo. He had no firm belief in the Imperial promise of confirming and maintaining the laws, nor any great sympathy for the new Government. The change his opinions soon underwent is a proof of Alexander's power of conciliating and fascinating the Finns. In his „Souvenirs de ma vie“, Rehbinder reports the words with which the Emperor, at the presentation, received him. „Political circumstances have forced me to carry on a war in your country, and since the success of our arms has determined your fate, I have had one thought only, and one aim: to make you happy, and to render your position such, that you may never have cause

State „Финляндія представляет совершенно обособленное во внутреннемъ управленіи государство хотя и нераздѣльно связанное съ русскою императорскою короною.“

to regret what you have lost. I have promised to maintain your laws, your privileges and institutions. I will keep my word, but there are also conditions that you must fulfil. May your countrymen never forget the truth, that it is only through perfect loyalty without any reservation that they will be able to make their new position a happy one and also useful to the Empire, of which their country in the future will form a part". A long time after, recalling to mind his first meeting with the noble Monarch, Reh binder wrote these words: „What he then promised he has indeed faithfully kept". By his open declaration the Emperor won, in the Finnish Nobleman, a warm adherent, who was fully resolved ever to remain loyal and faithful to his new Sovereign. The opportunity soon came for Reh binder to prove his loyalty. After a few weeks he was appointed assistant to Speransky for the consideration of Finnish affairs, in 1811 he was called upon to report on these affairs to the Monarch. In 1834 the title of Minister-Secretary of State was conferred upon him, and he remained in this high office until his death in 1841. During all these years he enjoyed the highest esteem and confidence of Alexander as well as of his successor, Nicholas.

It is of this man, M. Ordin informs us that he „acknowledged the almost republican principle, that the Monarch *reigned* but did not *rule* — „il régnait, mais il ne gouvernait pas" (O. II, 286). In his „Account of the modern history of Finland", Castrén gives a biography

of Count Rehbinder. In this biography M. Ordin found an expression, which provided him with an excuse for this charge. Castrén quotes, page 266, a passage from Rehbinder's diary, where the author blames the Russians for not having already in the spring of 1808, at least temporarily, organised the Government of Finland: „Then only they would have acted with consistency, and imparted some value to the set phrases about the resolution of the Russian Government not to abandon what it had acquired. But the courts of justice were left on their old footing, the local authorities remained the same and the governing bodies which should have directed and controlled their work were lacking. Providence had given us a new Sovereign; he reigned, but he did not rule. *Il régnait, mais il ne gouvernait pas*“. Later on Rehbinder adds: „In a constitutional country, whose people were accustomed to positive rules, even to minute formalities, and who dreaded above all things the caprice, or arbitrariness of an alter ego without complete power and certain instructions; in such a country such an omission would naturally make the very worst impression — and so it did“.

Hence the fact is, that Rehbinder blames Buxhoeveden for having applied to Finland the principle that the king reigns, but does not rule. M. Ordin distorts his words so as to make him an adherent of the principle, with which he actually finds fault. He is not even satisfied with having made this charge

once, but repeats it at least twice. On page 299 (II) he says: „Rehbinder's plan, that the Tsar should not rule in Finland, but only reign, was kept secret.“ Farther on, when speaking of Rehbinder's work during the Diet of Borgo, he bids his readers „by no means forget that this Finnish Nobleman, after having entered the Russian service, acted in accordance with secret principles, which would have remained unknown but for the publication of his memoirs. One among these was, that the Tsar might reign, but never rule in Finland“. (II, 395). We must admit that M. Ordin is great in the art of applying another principle, that of maître Basile: Calomniez, calomniez, il en reste toujours quelque chose!

It is a peculiar circumstance, worthy of notice, that Count Rehbinder, from the year 1827, was an honorary member of the same Academy of Science, which has now awarded a prize to the work, where his opinions and character are so insolently calumniated.

IV. THE DIET OF BORGO.

The decree in which the Emperor summoned the Estates of Finland to meet in Borgo on March $\frac{1}{2}$ 1809 for a general Diet, is dated St. Petersburg, $\frac{\text{Jan. } 20}{\text{Febr. } 1}$ of the same year.¹ It is issued in the name of the „Emperor and Autocrat over all the Russias etc., etc., etc, Grand Duke of Finland etc., etc., etc.“ This is the first time a Russian Monarch calls himself Grand Duke of Finland, a designation which ever after has formed a part of the title of the Tsars. In the manifesto of June $\frac{1}{7}$ 1808 Alexander had only called himself „Emperor and Autocrat over all the Russias“. For this and other reasons the confirmation of the laws of Finland, contained in the manifesto, should be considered only as a warrant of a certain provincial independence, such as the Baltic Provinces enjoyed. The employment of the title Grand Duke of Finland was the first intimation before the Finnish people, that the Emperor contemplated something more than pro-

¹ This decree, as well as most others of political importance, alluded to in this chapter, are printed in the original language in the collection: *Акты для выясненія политическаго положенія Великаго Княжества Финляндскаго*“. Helsingfors 1890.

vincial differences, in so far that he had come to the conclusion, that the promise of maintaining the laws of Finland, in order to become a reality, must also encompass the laws which determined the political rights of the Finnish people. That this is not an arbitrary interpretation of the Emperor's meaning and intention can be proved by many expressions of his. One of these occurs in the same manifesto, where he declares that his resolution to convoke a Diet was formed „conformément aux constitutions du pays“.

The opinions and intentions of the Tsar were fully shared by the man, to whom the direction of Finnish affairs nearest the throne was confided. In a report to the Emperor of Feb. 11, 1811 Michael Speransky declared: „Финляндія есть государство, а не губернія“ — Finland is a State, not a province.¹ In this spirit he directed the preparations for the Diet, of which the most important was the preparation of the Act of Assurance concerning the maintenance of the Constitution, which the Emperor intended to issue, as well as the inditement of propositions to be placed before the Estates. For all this some knowledge of the fundamental laws, as well as of old established Swedish customs with reference to the Diet, was absolutely necessary. Therefore, on the demand of Saltikoff, Baron Mannerheim already in Dec. gave him a short sketch of the cere-

¹ Collections of the Imperial Russian Historical Society. Tome XXI p. 456.

monies and proceedings at the Swedish Diets, as well as of the rights, which the fundamental laws granted to the Monarch and to the Estates. Later on Rehbinder and a M. Buck of the Secretary of State's Office, considered to be well versed in the Swedish public law, compiled an account of the statutes, institutions and customs referring to this subject, so that Speransky at the time of the Diet possessed a fairly accurate knowledge of the Swedish-Finnish Constitution.

Naturally every enactment of this Constitution was not applicable after the union of Finland with the Russian Empire. Speransky, as well as the Finnish Statesmen understood this perfectly. Hence the question naturally arose whether Alexander ought to place before the Estates proposals for the necessary alterations of the fundamental laws of Finland. Nearly all those to whom the Emperor or Speransky spoke on the subject were against such a proceeding as long as the war lasted. Sprengtporten spoke against it, so did Mannerheim and Baron de Geer, who, in his capacity of Marshal designate of the House of Nobles, took part in the preparations for the Diet. As far as we know only one of the Finnish gentlemen who were in St. Petersburg before the opening of the Diet, urged that the question of a new Constitution should be immediately attended to. This man was Sprengtporten's old associate from the times of the Anjala confederacy, major J. A. Jägerhorn.

In a long memorandum of Feb. 26 1809,¹ addressed to the Emperor, Jägerhorn proposes a complete revision of the fundamental laws of Finland, and even mentions the principal alterations which, according to his opinion, ought to be made. At first only the fundamental principles should be placed before the Estates for their acceptance, whereupon the Diet might be adjourned until the autumn, when the complete proposition for a new Constitution might be ready for discussion. Without entering into details we will place before the reader a few extracts, which will give him a clear idea of the spirit which pervaded this document.

Jägerhorn began by stating the situation with these words: „The nearer we approach the moment which will determine for the future the fate of our country, the deeper we feel the urgent necessity of collecting all the materials by means of which this great enterprise can be prepared and completed“. ² Before entering upon a criticism of details, or making the definite propositions resulting from it, the author makes some general reflections entitled: „Réflexions sur la néces-

¹ Published after the original in Finland's State archives by E. G. Palmén, in the journal of the Finnish Historical Society, Historiallinen Arkisto, Vol. VIII, 208—248.

² Plus nous approchons du moment qui pour jamais doit déterminer le sort de la patrie, plus nous sentons le grand besoin de ramasser les matériaux de toute espèce pour préparer et compléter cette grande entreprise.

sité, pour le bonheur de la nation finnoise, de maintenir son intégrité nationale“. After having sketched the outlines of the principal features of the physical and mental peculiarities of the Finnish people, in many ways differing from those of the Russians, Jägerhorn continues: „It is evident, that the same laws and institutions, which may be the wisest, most righteous and best suited for the Russian nation — when applied to Finland, even with the best of intentions, would not provide for the happiness of this country. Beyond a doubt even the mildest, most humane means, whereof His Majesty's Government forms an example, of introducing into Finland the same forms and methods, as those which are in force in the rest of his vast dominions, would, within a short time, change the Finnish character, destroy its virtue and its national spirit and bring into disorder the economical relations of the Finnish people which are now arranged on a basis compatible with the climate of Finland, and would moreover make the people spiritless and miserable.

„If any Government wants to rest its power over another country on the right of conquest alone i. e. to establish it by force or violence, which end in oppression and terrorism, then it is evident that such a Government, through its own principles, has laid the foundation of a future rebellion; it has so to speak appealed to every thing that is great and noble in the oppressed nation to rise as its secret or open foe.

History shows well enough how dangerous and fatal such political relations between two nations have always been. No people, however insignificant it may appear, must be despised in this respect; the great political changes always bring about events profitable for insurrections and revolts, when the seeds thereof have been sown, and then it is often fortune or chance which decide their importance“.

„I have ventured to pronounce this political truth, only in order to prove, that it would be wise to obliterate for ever from the memory of the Finns their old relations to Sweden. — — — The surest way of uniting the Finns for ever, and with all the loyalty of which this people is capable, to the new Monarch, is to make their political position such that they must decidedly gain by the change; this also is the only condition under which His Imperial Majesty can gain real advantage from his conquest“.¹

¹ Si une puissance quelconque voudrait établir sa domination sur un autre pays uniquement par le droit de la conquête, cela veut dire par les moyens de la force et de la violence, dont résulte l'oppression et le règne de la terreur, il est évident, qu'un tel régime a déjà organisé l'insurrection dans ses propres principes; il a, pour ainsi dire, commandé à tout ce qui soit encore grand et noble de la nation opprimée de devenir ses ennemis secrets ou déclarés, et l'histoire ne prouve que trop combien en tout temps des relations politiques dans ce genre ont été funestes et dangereuses. Aucun peuple, aussi chétif qu'il puisse paraître, n'est à mépriser sur ce point, les grands mouvements politiques produisent toujours des événements favorables aux troubles populaires

Jägerhorn refers to the assurances the Emperor had already given of his intentions concerning Finland, and also points out the significance of Alexander having adopted the title of Grand Duke of Finland. But he is of opinion, that this title ought to be exchanged for that of „King of Finland“, because His Majesty necessarily ought, as Sovereign of the country, to adopt all the power, the prerogatives and the royal dignity, with which of yore the Kings in Sweden and Finland have been invested.¹

The memorandum did not lead to the intended result. The opinion that the right time for such changes, as Jägerhorn proposed, was not come, won the day. This document, while it proves the author's patriotism and candid freedom, also bears witness to the lofty and

quand le germe en est jeté, et alors la fortune, les hasards ou un rien peut souvent seul décider le plus ou moins de leur importance.

J'ai osé mettre cette vérité politique en évidence uniquement pour prouver combien il est prudent d'effacer pour jamais de la mémoire des Finnois leur ancienne liaison avec la Suède. — De faire ainsi gagner solidement aux Finnois dans l'échange de leur état politique est sans doute le moyen le plus sûr de les attacher pour jamais et avec toute la fidélité, dont cette nation soit capable à leur nouveau souverain; c'est aussi l'unique condition par laquelle S. M. I puisse recueillir des avantages réels de sa conquête.“

¹ „— doit nécessairement attacher à Sa personne tout le pouvoir, les prerogatives et les dignités royales, dont nos anciens rois ont été revêtus“.

noble mind of the Sovereign, who with good-will listened to such warnings. Most probably the document did not remain quite without influence on Alexander's future action. At any rate his speech at the Borgo Diet is a production of very much the same spirit, which dictated Jägerhorn's communication.

On March $\frac{1}{2}$ 1809 the Emperor arrived in Borgo. He was accompanied by Speransky, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rummyantsoff, who had just returned from Paris, and by several other Statesmen and courtiers. On the day after his arrival he opened the Diet. On March the $\frac{1}{2}$ the solemn act took place which gives Borgo Diet its great political importance. After the Emperor had taken his seat in the Cathedral on the Throne with Finland's coat of arms, which had been erected for the occasion, he caused the Governor-General, Baron Sprengtporten to read to the assembled Estates his assurance to maintain Finland's Constitution. This document was originally written in Russian. We render it from its Swedish officially authorised translation.

WE ALEXANDER I, by the Grace of God Emperor and Autocrat over all the Russias etc., etc., etc., Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc. do make manifest: That Providence having placed Us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have desired, by the present act to confirm and ratify the Religion and fundamental laws of the Land, as well as the privi-

leges and rights which each class in the said Grand Duchy in particular, and all the inhabitants in general, be their position high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to the Constitution. We promise to maintain all these benefits and laws firm and unshaken in their full force. In confirmation whereof We have signed this Act of Assurance with Our own hand. Given in Borgo March 15 (27) 1809.

The original is signed:

ALEXANDER.

After it had been read the Emperor caused this assurance to be solemnly delivered into the custody of the Marshal of the House of Nobles, as being the highest representative of the Estates. Then the Speakers stepped forward, each expressing his gratitude to the Emperor in the name of the Estate he represented, whereupon the Estates approached the throne in corpore, one after the other, and took the oath of allegiance in which they promised — we quote the words in which the House of Nobles took the oath — „to have and to consider as their lawful authority the great and mighty Prince and Lord Alexander I, Emperor and Autocrat over all the Russias and Grand Duke of Finland, and to keep inviolate the fundamental laws and the Constitution of the Land, such as they are now adopted and in force“.

On $\frac{\text{March } 23}{\text{April } 4}$ the Emperor issued the following decree, concerning his declaration and the oath of fealty of the Estates:

The Original, signed by the Emperor and Grand Duke is French:

NOUS ALEXANDRE PREMIER, Empereur et Autocrateur de toutes les Russies etc. etc. etc. Grand Duc de Finlande etc. etc.

Ayant réuni les états de la Finlande en une Diète générale, et reçu leurs sermens de fidélité, NOUS avons voulu à cette occasion par un acte solennel émané en leur présence et proclamé dans le sanctuaire de l'Être Suprême confirmer et assurer le maintien de la Religion, des loix fondamentales, les droits et les privilèges dont chaque état en particulier et tous les habitans de la Finlande en général ont joui jusqu'à présent.

En faisant promulguer cet acte par ces présentes, NOUS croyons devoir instruire en même temps NOS fidèles sujets de Finlande qu'en NOUS conformant à l'usage antique et révééré de ce pays, NOUS regardons les sermens de fidélité prêtés par les états en général et par les députés des paysans en particulier en leur nom et en celui de leurs commettans de leurs mouvemens propres et spontanés comme bons et obliga-

WE ALEXANDER I, Emperor and Autocrat over all the Russias, etc. etc. etc., Grand Duke of Finland, etc. etc., do make manifest: That when We convoked Finland's Estates to a General Diet and received their oath of Allegiance, We did, on that occasion, desire, by means of a solemn Act, prepared in their presence and proclaimed in the Sanctuary of the Most High, to confirm and secure to them the maintenance of their Religion and fundamental laws, together with the liberties and rights that each Estate, in particular, and all Finland's Inhabitants in general, have hitherto enjoyed. Moreover, whilst hereby announcing to our faithful Finnish subjects the above-mentioned Act, We are also desirous of notifying to them, that, as We have maintained and adapted Ourselves to the time-honoured custom of this Land, We do deem the oath of Fealty that the Estates, in general, and the Deputation of Peasants, in particular, did freely and unconstrainedly take, in the name of their brethren at home as well, to be good and binding on all the Inhabitants of Finland, without exception. Thoroughly con-

toires pour tous les habitans de la Finlande.

Intimement persuadé que ce peuple bon et loyale conservera à jamais pour NOUS et pour NOS successeurs les mêmes sentimens de fidélité et d'attachement inviolable qui l'ont toujours distingué, Nous Nous attacherons à lui donner avec l'aide de Dieu de preuves continuelles de NOS soins assidus et paternels pour son bonheur et sa prospérité. A Borgo ce 23 Mars 1809.

vinced that this good and honest People will ever cherish toward Us and Our successors that same fidelity and unshaken attachment for which It has always distinguished Itself, We shall not fail with the Almighty's aid, to afford Them further proof of Our constant Fatherly solicitude for Their happiness and wellbeing. Borgo, March 23 1809.

The act of allegiance in Borgo Cathedral was followed by the singing of the Te Deum „We praise Thee O God“. Afterwards, when at His Majesty's special command, the Assurance and the Gracious Decree of ^{March 23}_{April 4} 1809 were read from the pulpits of all the churches in Finland, the same hymn, to the Glory of the Most High, was sung by every congregation. On that day the copies of the Assurance and of the Decree were hung in all the churches and still hang side by side with the assurances to maintain the laws of the country, which all the successors of Alexander I have issued and endorsed with their signature. Thus, even in the most distant tracts, generation after generation of the Finnish people have learnt to look with reverence, in the Temple of the Lord, on these documents, which not only exhort them to unflinching fidelity to their Sovereign and their country, but also constitute

an incontestible testimony of the sacred obligations, which the Monarchs of the Land and of the Empire have undertaken to fulfil towards their Finnish subjects.

With great unwillingness we now, after the contemplation of these facts, turn our attention to the sophisms, with which M. Ordin tries to explain away the significance of the Imperial promise. His statements on this subject are mostly repetitions, though in an enlarged and somewhat altered form, of his remarks on M. Mechelin's work. „*Précis du droit public du Grand Duché de Finlande*“, and of kindred assertions made at the time of the controversy which these remarks provoked. He tries to prove, now, as he did then, that Alexander I did not confirm any Constitution for Finland. This assertion standing in direct opposition to the Act of Assurance and many other solemn declarations of the Emperor M. Ordin is forced to adopt methods, the employment of which is probably unprecedented in the historical literature of any country.

M. Ordin as a sort of introduction first tries to lessen the importance of the Assurance on the plea, that the Emperor and his advisers hardly „had an approximate knowledge even“ of the fundamental laws of Finland, or of the privileges of the Finnish Estates (II, 300, 315). And yet he knows and partly even relates the reports of Mannerheim, Rehbinder and Buck on the

organisation of the Swedish Diet and the rights of the Monarch and the representatives of the people. In one place he seems inclined to admit that the Emperor had possibly acquired some knowledge of the rights and privileges of the Diet through these reports, but makes haste to add (II, 299): „But of one thing there can be no doubt, that the memorials placed before the Emperor for his information, such as for instance the letter of Mannerheim to Saltikoff and the reports of Reh binder and Buck but lightly touched upon or passed by in silence the fact of the Sovereign being left destitute of rights“. That is true. Nobody drew his attention to such a fact, because it would have been absurd to speak about a Monarch being destitute of rights, whose prerogatives were founded on the „Form of Government“ of 1772 and on the „Act of Union and Security“ of 1789. But the memorials do point out distinctly that the Emperor's prerogatives, even according to these laws, are subjected to some constitutional restrictions. Mannerheim for instance does not beat about the bush. „The Sovereign cannot“, he says, „without the consent of the Estates undertake any alteration in the fundamental laws, in the civil and criminal laws of 1734, or in the privileges of the separate Estates, nor can he impose new taxes“.¹ Buck again writes thus: „The Estates of the Swedish

¹ „Le Souverain ne peut rien changer dans les loix fondamentales, les loix crimineles et civiles, établies l'an 1734, les privilèges de chaque ordre, ni établir de nouvelles impôts sans le consentement des Etats“.

realm consist of 4 orders: the Nobles, the clergy, the burgesses and the peasants, and as all questions must be discussed by each Estate, no measure which the Diet has to debate can be sanctioned by the Monarch unless the majority, i. e. three Estates, have passed it, but for all resolutions concerning taxes or contributions, whether personal or land taxes, the consent of the four Estates is necessary".¹ Rehbinder's memorandum finally contains the following account of the rights and prerogatives of the Monarch and the representatives in our country:

„Finland, from the most distant times united to Sweden, has been governed in accordance with its fundamental as well as civil laws. The former are chiefly based on three principles: the country is governed by a King, who is subject to the laws; all inhabitants without exception are free and in enjoyment of full safety for their lives and property; and the nation has, through its representatives, the right of establishing its Constitution, of making laws and levying taxes".²

¹ „Les Etats du Royaume de Suède (Riksans ständer) sont composés de quatre ordres, savoir: celui de la noblesse, du clergé, des bourgeois et des paysans, et tous les objets devant être débattus par chaque ordre, aucun point dont la diète aura eu à délibérer ne peut être sanctionné par le Souverain à moins que la pluralité ou trois ordres ne l'ait adopté, mais tout objet d'impôt ou de contribution personnelle ou territoriale ne peut être adopté qu'au consentement des quatre ordres".

² That the sanction of the king also was absolutely necessary is evident from the following.

„The King has the prerogative of appointing all the officials. Offices of importance, for which a certain amount of confidence is necessary, are at the King's immediate disposal. He also has the power of discharging, without formalities, all those who fail in the performance of their duties, thus forfeiting the confidence placed in them. When any other office is to be filled, three of the most able persons are proposed as candidates, among these the King chooses one, and presents the successful candidate with his credentials. These officials can only be impeached after legal investigation and judgment. The King has moreover at his disposal the income of the State, he decides the salary for every officer, as well as certain taxes, such as postage, stamped paper etc., but all other taxes can, as above mentioned, be levied only with the consent of the Estates, whom the King alone has the right of convoking. He submits to the Diet the subjects on which he requests the opinion of the representatives, beyond which they are not entitled to extend their discussions; yet they may ask for the Monarch's sanction to discuss any other subject they consider absolutely necessary for the welfare of the country. The King may grant or refuse their demand as he sees fit. He has also the right to dissolve the Diet when it so pleases him“.

„Formerly the Diet met every third year and even oftener and was possessed of much more extensive privileges than is now the case, but after the revolution

of 1772 and the Act of Security of 1789 its rights were restricted to the aforesaid subjects".¹

¹ „La Finlande, depuis les temps les plus reculés réunie à la Suède, a été gouvernée d'après ses loix, tant fondamentales que civiles. Les premières se fondent principalement sur trois principes: 1:º Que le pays soit gouverné par un roi assujetti aux loix, 2:º Que tous les citoyens sans exception soient libres ainsi que protégés tant à la vie qu'à leurs propriétés, et 3:º Que la nation, moyennant ses représentants a le droit de faire sa constitution, dicter les loix, et stipuler les contributions du pays.“

„Le droit du roi est celui de pourvoir à tous les offices; de telles places ou charges qui demandent une certaine confiance et qui sont de conséquence sont à la disposition immédiate du roi, qui en même temps a le pouvoir d'en démettre sans formalité ceux qui manquent à leurs devoirs et par-là ont perdu la confiance en eux mise. Pour toutes les autres places trois personnes les plus habiles sont présentées, dont le roi en choisira un, le munira de son brevet; ceux-ci ne peuvent être chargés sans avoir subi le procès et été jugés en forme. Plus, le roi est à la disposition des revenus de l'état et fixe les salaires de chaque place, ainsi que certaines taxes, c. a. d. la poste, le papier timbré etc; mais tous les autres impôts dépendent, comme susdit, des Etats, que le roi est seulement de droit de rassembler pour une diète, ou il leur présente les matières dont il souhaite leurs avis et au-dessus de quoi ils n'ont pas le droit d'étendre leurs délibérations; pourtant il est à eux réservé de demander le consentement du roi d'entreprendre matière quelconque qu'ils jugent absolument nécessaire pour le bien du pays, ce qui peut leur être affirmé ou nié suivant l'opinion du roi. Aussi dépend-t-il du roi de finir la diète quand bon lui semble“.

„Ci-devant les Etats s'assemblèrent chaque 3:º année et même plus souvent et avaient des droits bien plus larges qu'à présent

And now we ask, — not M. Ordin, of course, but the impartial reader, — whether the Emperor and Speransky, after having studied the reports of Mannerheim, Rehbinder and the Russian official Buck, can be considered to have remained in ignorance of the restrictions, which the power of the Monarch was subjected to, according to Finnish law. As a circumstance of especial importance for a right comprehension of Alexander's conduct at the Diet in Borgo the reader should not forget that all these extracts from the Swedish-Finnish public law were written and delivered to the Emperor, before he left for Borgo, where he signed the assurance to maintain the laws of Finland, and opened the Diet.

When we come to consider M. Ordin's account of the summons to the representatives, we notice first of all that he leaves out and altogether ignores the introduction, in which the Emperor for the first time assumes the title of „Grand Duke of Finland“. M. Ordin considers the spirit of this document to be in harmony with the manifesto of June 5-17 1808, and in order to prove this mentions the circumstance that in it the Estates were convoked „conformément aux constitutions du pays“, not „conformément à la Constitution“ (II, 303). This manœuvre of M. Ordin's is known to the reader from the controversy about M. Mechelin's book. We must later on return to this subject and will now

mais depuis le changement de régence de 1772 et l'acte de Sureté en 1789 ils sont restreints aux circonstances ci-dessus nommées“.

only put a simple question: To which laws does M. Ordin believe that the summons to the representatives refers if not to the political laws, which together form the Constitution of Finland, since the Emperor says, that he had formed his resolution to convoke the Diet „conformément aux constitutions du pays“, and when he further commands the representatives to meet: „de la manière prescrite dans les réglemens de diète?“

We mentioned above that Baron de Geer, in his capacity of Marshal designate of the House of Nobles, took part in the preparations for the Diet at St. Petersburg. The Bishop of Abo, Jakob Tengström, appointed to lead the discussions of the clergy, was also called to the capital. Both took their oaths as Speakers there. The formula, according to which they took this oath, previously approved by the Emperor, is in itself a conclusive proof that it was his firm intention to confirm the maintenance for Finland of the Swedish-Finnish Constitution.

De Geer took his oath in French, in these words: „Moi, soussigné, promets et jure devant Dieu et sur Son saint Evangile, que par la grâce de S. M. l'Empereur de Russie et Grand Duc de Finlande, mon Maître, étant nommé maréchal de la noblesse à la diète de Finlande, convoquée dans la ville de Borgo, je soutiendrai et appuierai avec impartialité et intrépidité tous les droits de la Couronne, ainsi que les privilèges de la noblesse et les droits des États, conformément aux constitutions en vigueur et aux loix

fondamentales confirmées par S. M. l'Empereur; que je remplirai les devoirs de ma charge d'après les règlements et statuts, et que je ne souffrirai rien qui puisse porter préjudice ou désavantage aux intérêts de l'Empereur et de ma patrie. Je m'engage, sur la foi et l'honneur de chevalier, d'accomplir ces promesses, et prie Dieu de sauver mon âme autant que j'observerai ce serment; ainsi Dieu me soit en aide en mon corps et en mon âme“.

Bishop Tengström's oath was couched in the same words, with certain changes, referring to his position as representative of the Lutheran Church in Finland. The bishop, for instance, engages to maintain and defend the Lutheran faith: „Je ferai tous mes efforts pour maintenir et défendre la vraie et pure doctrine évangélique luthérienne“.

M. Ordin's analysis of these oaths results in the assertion, that they ascribe to the Emperor the absolute power of an Autocrat, also in Finland. He comes to this conclusion partly by comparing the oaths we have just mentioned with those taken by the Swedish Marshal of the House of Nobles and by the Swedish Archbishop. Let us examine his reasoning.

M. Ordin in the first place attaches importance to the circumstance that the title of „Landtmarskalk“ should have originally belonged to the President of all the representatives of the people but that, in the French text of de Geer's oath, it was rendered with „maréchal de la noblesse“ According to his opinion this would

„naturally have completely changed the character and significance of the Landtmarskalk's office and to some extent placed him on a level with the Russian marshals of nobility“ (II, 312). This is, however, quite a groundless supposition. In his relations to the other Speakers (Presidents) the Marshal of the House of Nobles had not been anything but *primus inter pares*, and by no means a President of all the Estates. In the memorandum of Dec. 28, 1808 where he gives an account of the Diet in *Sweden*, Mannerheim already translates the Swedish word „landtmarskalk“ into „maréchal de la noblesse,“ while Speransky, on the other hand, in his reports and communications belonging to the period of the Borgo Diet, always calls de Geer „maréchal de la diète“, which fact M. Ordin might ascertain from the appendices of his own book. This naturally also refutes the supposition of a difference in the significance of these appellations.

The argument M. Ordin next employs is even weaker. De Geer's oath contains the expression „appointed by the Grace of His Majesty“, whereas the Swedish Marshal, in a document produced by M. Ordin, talks of his appointment without making use of this epithet. Such flimsy arguments may well lead to the strangest results, which any one will easily find out by noting, for instance, how very lavish people were with these expressions during the „time of liberty“ in Sweden. From the point of view of public law an argument of this kind is naturally quite valueless.

Though the differences, called attention to by M. Ordin, between the oath of the Speakers, such as it was prescribed in Sweden, and such as it was taken in 1809 by de Geer and Tengström, are fictitious or insignificant, yet there is one difference worth noticing, though it does not by any means prove what M. Ordin wants it to. He calls attention to the fact that the Speakers in Sweden undertook to maintain the rights and privileges of the Estates in accordance with definite, specially mentioned laws, while de Geer — without naming any particular statute — only referred to „the Constitutions in force and the fundamental laws, confirmed by H. M. the Emperor“. (II, 314). This formula, to begin with, we beg to state, does not refer to the maintenance of the liberties and rights of the Estates alone, but also to the promise of maintaining all the rights of the *Crown*. If it were too vague for the one, it must needs be too vague for the other. In order to avoid misunderstandings we will further ask the reader to bear in mind that the words „confirmées par S. M. l'Empereur“ do not, as M. Ordin asserts, imply that the Emperor confirmed only certain fundamental laws. The fact that they do not even occur in Tengström's oath, proves how wrong it is to attribute such a limited significance to them. Without mentioning the confirmation by the Emperor of the fundamental laws, the Speaker (President) of the clergy promises to maintain and defend the Lutheran faith and „les droits de la

couronne et la liberté des états, conformément aux constitutions en vigueur et aux loix fondamentales“. Considering these suggestions sufficient for the present we will later on give further attention to the conclusions M. Ordin draws from the fact that the separate fundamental laws are not enumerated either in the Speakers' (Presidents'), oaths or in the Imperial assurance issued at the Diet.

M. Ordin has a great deal more to say about the Speakers' oath. He considers the fact of de Geer having sworn to maintain all the rights of the Crown — „tous les droits de la couronne“ — of enormous importance. The rights of the Crown. Of what Crown? There did not exist any Finnish Crown or Throne, he reasons „Consequently de Geer took the oath to no other Crown than that of the Russian Emperor. And according to Russian public law the Russian Emperor has the absolute power of an Autocrat. *Absolute*, his power is not limited by any higher law than his own authority. *Autocrat*, he does not share his right to rule with any Estate or institution; in his realm his will is law without the consent or sanction of any other institution. Finland was now united to the Russian Empire as a part of it, and naturally at the same time became subject to the principle of absolute autocracy“. (II, 313).

Here we have another instance of M. Ordin's mode of conducting his case. He does not even attempt to prove the facts, the verification of which ought to be

of the greatest importance to him. It was for him to demonstrate that the Emperor Alexander, when he received the oaths of de Geer and of Tengström, really understood the Crown, i. e. the governing power in Finland, to be identical with that of Russia. But to this important circumstance, he does not refer. His readers must be content to know that M. Ordin supposes this identity to exist. He naturally also leaves unexplained and does not even hint at the question, how it is possible in the same oath to admit the Emperor's power to be absolute, and yet not only engage to maintain the rights of the Crown in so far as the fundamental laws permit, but also to promise to maintain and defend the rights and liberties possessed by the Estates according to the fundamental law.

M. Ordin proceeds to make the assertion, that when de Geer and Tengström promised to defend the interests of their country — „de ma patrie“ — they referred solely to Russia. The Swedish Marshal of Nobility and the Archbishop, in their oaths, also named „their country“, and meant Sweden. Now Russia had entered into the rights of Sweden, consequently it was the new fatherland of de Geer and Tengström whose interests they promised to guard. Not until later on „as is well known“, have the Finns begun to recognise only Finland as their fatherland, working for its interests to the detriment of Russia (II, 317). It would be too naïve to suppose that M. Ordin believes all this, himself. He knows full well that the Finns

in 1809 considered Finland their fatherland, and that Alexander I, as well as his successors, in this respect made a decided difference between Finland and the Empire. In the speech with which the Emperor opened the Diet, he addressed himself to the Estates with these words: *J'ai désiré vous voir pour vous donner une nouvelle preuve de Mes intentions pour le bien de votre patrie*“.

The circumstance that Alexander permitted the Finnish bishop to swear to maintain „the true and pure Evangelical-Lutheran creed“ is not only a beautiful instance of his religious tolerance, but also a proof that he recognised Finland's *internal* independence. Arrived at this point M. Ordin quite forgets the outward respect he has hitherto on the whole observed towards the memory of Alexander and Speransky. The reader is informed that the weakness of religious conviction, which distinguished the time, was the origin of this weakness in the Emperor and his Secretary of State. „Nor is this astonishing concerning Alexander I who, it is said, did not know the bible before his thirtieth year, but the former pupil in the Alexander Newsky Seminary for the Clergy, Speransky, by allowing such a thing to pass, renounced his faith“ (II, 316—317). — The author forgets that one might question who better understood the essence of Christian Religion, Alexander and Speransky or their spiteful slanderer. Recognising and respecting religious liberty and the precepts of a humane and noble spirit, they have in their mutual

work sown the seeds from which have sprung peace of conscience and the happiness of millions, while the doctrines of M. Ordin and his adherents are redolent with the charnelhouse atmosphere of their levelling and destroying tendencies and full of the deadly poison of religious oppression and national hatred.

M. Ordin's explanation of the Imperial Act of Assurance of March $\frac{1}{2}$, 1809 and other enactments of the Emperor connected with it, now claims our attention. It is by no means easy to give a summary of his statements, because the author, probably aware of the weakness of his evidence, heaps assertion upon assertion in chaotic confusion.

The reader will remember that, during the controversy about M. Mechelin's book „*Précis du droit public*“ M. Ordin pointed out differences between the Russian original and the Swedish translation of the Emperor's declaration.¹ In his own book he again points out these mistakes, and produces some new ones, and naturally complains of their baneful influence on the relations between Russia and Finland (II, 338—341).

During the controversy we admitted — and we do so now — that the translation was by no means so diplomatically accurate as such documents in our times are expected to be. But we most decidedly retain our opinion that the differences are in every way insignificant, the Swedish translation also being a faithful rendering of the Monarch's intentions.

¹ Cf. page 7.

M. Ordin's first remark is to the effect that the word „anew“, вновь, in the Russian text placed before „confirm and ratify the Religion and fundamental laws of the country“ was left out in the Swedish text. This omission, he thinks, indicated an attempt on the part of the Finns to enhance the importance of the gracious declaration of Borgo, by ignoring previous promises. The Finns had no such intention, which is proved for instance by the fact that on the day before the Imperial declaration was communicated and delivered to the Estates, their Speakers (Presidents), in solemn audience, thanked H. M. on behalf of the Estates for his gracious promise to maintain the Religion and Constitution of the country.

The second remark concerns the addition in the Swedish text of the words „of the country“ to the word religion. The Russian text according to M. Ordin speaks only of the confirmation and ratification of the religion of all subjects in general and of every subject in particular, but by the addition of those words the Lutheran faith becomes established. It is however self-evident, that the promise, even if couched in the most general terms, must have embraced the Lutheran faith which nearly all the inhabitants of the then conquered part of Finland professed. It was really only through the reunion of the province of Viborg to the rest of the country that the Russian faith obtained some importance here. But apart from this there is no doubt that the ratification of the „religion“ signified the maintenance

of the Lutheran faith as the Established Church of Finland. Even according to the Russian text, the Emperor confirmed „the rights and liberties every Estate in this Grand Duchy — — — — has hitherto enjoyed“. In the privileges of the clergy, for one thing, the rights of the Lutheran Church, such as they had developed since the Reformation, were scrupulously stated. Further Bishop Tengström's oath, the formula of which was, as we know, sanctioned by the Emperor, contains the promise: „to maintain and defend the true and pure Evangelical-Lutheran faith“. The expression „the Religion of the country“, finally, occurs in a document, sanctioned by the Emperor and solemnly delivered to the Estates. The Imperial propositions to the Diet, signed by Speransky, and in the presence of H. M. read to the Estates, on March $\frac{1}{2}$ are introduced with the following explanation: „Sa Majesté Impériale en réunissant les états de Finlande en une Diète générale a bien voulu donner par là une preuve solennelle de ses intentions généreuses de conserver et maintenir inviolablement *la religion, les loix, la constitution du pays*, les droits et privilèges de tous les états en général et de chaque citoyen en particulier“.

The error in translation M. Ordin next quotes is the rendering of „subjects“ by „inhabitants“. That is, of course an inaccuracy, but M. Ordin's assertion that the Emperor's declaration concerned only those among Finland's inhabitants, who had taken the oath of

allegiance the previous year and hence had acknowledged themselves to be Russian subjects, is fully refuted by Alexander's reiterated explanation. In the speech with which the Emperor received the oath of allegiance tendered by the Estates he mentions it as taken by the inhabitants of Finland — „les habitans de la Finlande“ — and refers to his declaration with these words: „En leur (aux habitans de la Finlande) promettant de maintenir leur religion, leurs loix fondamentales, j'ai voulu etc.“ In the gracious decree of $\frac{\text{March } 23}{\text{April } 4}$ the Emperor declared that he desired, through this declaration, „confirmer et assurer — les droits et privilèges — dont tous les habitans de la Finlande ont joui jusqu'à présent“.

M. Ordin's fourth remark is directed against the use of the word „Constitution“ in the singular, in Swedish, whereas it occurs in the plural in the Russian text. We can but repeat what we have said before in our polemic with M. Ordin. In his speech at the opening of the Diet the Emperor said to the Estates: „J'ai promis de maintenir votre constitution, vos loix fondamentales“. In the introduction to the propositions to be placed before the Diet there is, as we have seen, the same formal promise of the Emperor, to maintain „la Constitution du pays“. We might add several other instances of the occurrence, in the singular, of the word Constitution, in documents belonging to that period, and approved by the Emperor. Among these we will, however, choose only one, which proves that

the Estates understood the matter exactly in the same way. In his speech before the throne, at the Proclamation on March $\frac{1}{2}$ the Speaker (President) of the Order of Peasants expressed the gratitude of the Estate for the Emperor's promise to maintain the *Constitution of Finland*. The speech was translated to the Emperor in French: „Aussi l'ordre des paysans va mettre aux pieds de V. M. I. ses remerciements les plus soumis de l'assurance solennelle, scellée par la signature de Votre nom auguste, que V. M. I vient de donner aujourd'hui selon les loix fondamentales de ce pays du maintien très gracieux de la constitution de Finlande.

Well, and how does M. Ordin explain away these assurances and declarations which are so clear and distinct that no misunderstanding of them ought to be possible? — the reader probably asks himself at this juncture, and the answer will be: Partly by mentioning some in an offhand way, without commenting upon them, by placing others among the appendices of his book, and finally by translating the word Constitution where it occurs in the singular, by „order“ and „organisation.“¹ (II, 343). The reader will undoubtedly find it somewhat hard to believe that Alexander I, the disciple of la Harpe, did not understand the significance of the word Constitution, and did not know what expressions such as to maintain „votre constitu-

¹ M. Ordin's opinion on this question (II, 340) with a reference to the assurances, on their accession to the throne, of Alexander II and of Alexander III will be discussed later on.

tion“, „la constitution du pays“, „la constitution de Finlande“ etc, involved.

In his last remark against the translation M. Ordin points out as a deviation of the greatest importance the fact that the manifesto in the Russian text is called *rpainora*, — which word he considers synonymous with „edict, command, diploma, patent or letter, — whereas the Swedish text renders it with the expression „Act of Assurance“ (*försäkringsakt*) commonly used in Sweden. We can easily find out how far this remark is justified by ascertaining how the Emperor expressed himself about this manifesto. In the decree of $\frac{\text{March } 23}{\text{April } 4}$ the Emperor calls this manifesto, which was read to the Estates and delivered into their custody in the Temple of the Most High „un acte solemnel“, through which he desired to „confirm and assure“ (*confirmer et assurer*) the inhabitants of Finland in the maintenance of their Religion etc.¹ But this is not all. In the ceremonial set down for the occasion when the Estates were to take the oath of allegiance § 7 refers to the manifesto as „l'Acte de confirmation“.² The nearest possible Swedish version of this expression is „*försäkringsakt*“ (act of assurance), which is in fact quite a literal translation. But even if we were to set aside all the French expressions used by the Emperor, we find that

¹ In his translation of this document M. Ordin (II, 358) leaves out the word „acte“ in the two places where it occurs in the French text.

² Cf. page 8.

„försäkringsakt“ also renders the word used in the Russian text with fair accuracy, for in his work on „the Russian Public Law“ § 36, Professor Gradofsky explains that the word *pravora* always refers to an act through which privileges are determined.¹

We have now come to the end of M. Ordin's criticism of the translation of this document. When the criticism first appeared, during the controversy about M. Mechelin's book „Précis du droit public“ he forbore to state what he supposed to be the origin of these mistakes.² Now he no longer hesitates to call the document „forged“. That is the very word he uses. This author who in his work commits no end of distortions of facts, some of which are of a very grave character, — we remind our readers only of his rendering of that part of Rehbinders's memoirs, where their author speaks of the Monarch's function in our country — this same man is bold enough to declare that, in Finland, gene-

¹ Here we are bound to call attention to M. Ordin's imputation that „the Finnish authors in direct opposition to an unmistakable fact“ represent the Manifesto of March 14th as equivalent to the assurance as regents which the Kings of Sweden, according to the fundamental law, were obliged to issue (II, 354). Also in this point the way in which we have been accustomed to represent it fully coincides with the interpretation which was prevalent at the time of the Proclamation. We have already quoted an extract of the Speech where the Speaker of the Peasantry referred to the assurance as delivered „selon les loix fondamentales de ce pays“. —

² Novoe Vremya Janyary 1^o, 1888.

ration after generation have grown up and formed their political opinions in the belief, that this „forged translation“ was a true and authentic one (II, 340—341).

The fundamental laws, „коренные законы“ were, as we know, confirmed in the manifesto of March $\frac{1}{2}$. This is extremely awkward for M. Ordin, for does it not frustrate his attempts to explain away the word „Constitution?“ But he must of course continue in the road he has once entered upon and therefore bravely undertakes to explain away the words „коренные законы“. He propounds a theory about a difference between коренные законы, „root-laws“ and основные законы, „fundamental laws“. Only the latter were of a political nature in that they determined the basis for the organisation of the State, whereas the former do but indicate „subjects for a general and old established idea“, such as at that time in Finland the liberty of the peasantry, the right of everybody to possess land, and freedom from compulsory recruiting.¹ Naturally, according to M. Ordin, the Emperor's confirmation of „коренные законы“ only includes these latter rights and liberties (II, 336). But the Emperor himself several times used the French words „loix fondamentales“. In the gracious Decree of $\frac{\text{March } 23}{\text{April } 4}$ he even formally states,

¹ M. Ordin does not reveal the fact that the political rights of the people, their share in legislation and in taxation in Sweden and Finland were institutions quite as old-established and time-honoured, as their social liberty, and that all these rights together had grown into an organic whole.

that in his declaration to the Estates — the very document where the words „коренные законы“ occur — he had engaged himself to the „maintien — des lois fondamentales“. There is no other resource open to M. Ordin but to attribute to the well known French term the same limited significance he gives to the Russian expression. In the same spirit he translates the declaration: „J'ai promis de maintenir votre constitution, vos lois fondamentales“ as referring only to the maintenance of a certain, more or less undetermined, administrative „order“, and to some still more indefinite laws concerning the liberty of the peasantry etc. (II, 344).

This kind of translation every body will admit is hardly worthy of serious consideration. The reader will however probably be astonished to hear, that the whole theory of a difference between the expressions „коренные“ and „основные“ is false. Such is however the case, which a comparison of the separate terms with which the definition „fundamental law“ has been rendered in the laws of Russia, during different periods, will show. An instance which forms about the best illustration of these facts are the different terms applied to the Emperor Paul's decree of April 1st 1797 concerning the Imperial family, a decree which, beyond a doubt, belongs to the fundamental laws of Russia. Closely adhering to the old and well-known French expression, Paul, in his decree, calls it „фундаментальный закон“. In his manifesto of December 1st 1825 concerning the

resignation of the Grand Duke Constantine and his own accession to the throne, the Emperor Nicholas, again referring to it, repeatedly calls the same decree: „коренной законъ“. This same term, in referring to the same law occurs in the manifesto of $\frac{\text{Aug. } 22}{\text{Sept. } 3}$ 1826, about the conduct of the government in case of the Emperor's demise, before the coming of age of the Tsarevitch. On the other hand the collection of the fundamental laws of Russia, which was codified by the Emperor Nicholas and is still valid, refers, in giving the source of Clause 1, to the same law by the Emperor Paul under the rubric „основной законъ“, which words also occur in the title of the collection.¹ But even in this collection the law about the Imp. Family has at least once been designated: „коренной законъ“, i. e. in the note of art. 139. There are then, as we have seen, a number of different renderings of the expression „fundamental law“ in the legal terminology which is in use in the most important collection of laws of the Empire, and in separate statutes of great importance. We find the words „коренной“ and „основной законъ“ as absolutely synonymous used about the same decree. Hence M. Ordin, in attributing to them different meanings, is either ignorant or wilfully blind. Later on the reader will be able to ascertain that the Russian legal terminology in Finland, concerning the contested expression, was at the time of Alexander I, as well as

¹ Сводъ основныхъ Государственныхъ законовъ.

later on, conformable to the contemporary usage in the Empire.

We fear that the reader may be tired of this lengthy discussion of M. Ordin's arbitrary interpretation of the manifesto of March $\frac{1}{2}$, 1809. Yet we are obliged further to tax his patience, for we have undertaken in important points to follow M. Ordin into every nook and cranny of his criticism of the document.

Let us for a moment suppose that the unreasonable were reasonable, and that all M. Ordin has said about Constitution and fundamental laws, were right and true. What would then remain of Alexander I's declaration? The Monarch's confirmation of „the privileges and rights, which each class in the said Grand Duchy in particular, and all the inhabitants, in general, be their position high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to the Constitution“. Or, to quote the words in the gracious Decree of $\frac{\text{March } 23}{\text{April } 4}$, the confirmation of „les droits et les privilèges dont chaque état en particulier, et tous les habitans de la Finlande en général, ont joui jusqu'à présent“. One of the privileges the Finnish people had enjoyed during the Union with Sweden was the right of sharing, with the Monarch, through its lawful representatives, the management of the general affairs of the State. But the Finnish-Swedish representatives were divided into Estates, and among the privileges of the separate Estates the first and foremost was their right to share in the legislation and taxation. Alexander's promise

to maintain the privileges and rights each Estate in particular, and all the inhabitants in general, had thereunto enjoyed, therefore, even without referring to the promise of maintaining the Constitution and the fundamental laws, which the same declaration contained, forms a binding ratification of the political rights of the Finnish people, i. e. of Finland's Constitution.

Referring to the first words of the Act of Assurance: „Providence having placed Us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland“, M. Ordin says: „These words contain the principle, not of a constitutional but of an absolute Monarch, who derives his power from God“ (II, 335—336). M. Ordin's ideas are obviously confused, and one cannot help asking, whether he does not indeed know, that even constitutional Monarchs derive their power from God, and that, more especially the King of Sweden, even during the „time of liberty“, styled himself King „by the Grace of God“.

M. Ordin several times mentions as a reason why Alexander could not possibly have confirmed the Finnish Constitution, that such an act would have been antagonistic to the Constitution of Russia. We will for a moment look at matters from M. Ordin's point of view, and suppose — though the idea is absurd and incompatible with the real facts — that Finland at the opening of the Borgo Diet obeyed the same laws as Russia. Was not the Russian Autocrat free to give Finland a separate Constitution, if he chose? And does he not even now possess the right to confer a Con-

stitution upon his Empire, or on some part of it? — If we now look at matters in their true light, and remember that not a single Russian ukase was in force here in 1809, the question will take this form: Can the Russian Autocrat be a constitutional Monarch in a country indissolubly united to the Empire? M. Ordin's assertion containing a denial of this possibility, we recommend for his perusal the following extract from the Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, Clause I: „Le Duché de Varsovie — est réuni à l'Empire de Russie. Il y sera lié irrévocablement par sa Constitution, pour être possédé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, Ses héritiers et Ses successeurs à perpétuité. Sa Majesté Impériale se réserve de donner à cet Etat, jouissant d'une administration distincte, l'extension intérieure qu'Elle jugera convenable. Elle prendra avec Ses autres titres celui de Czar, Roi de Pologne. — Les Polonois, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche, et de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des institutions nationales“.

In accordance with this article of the Congress-Act the Emperor signed the Constitution of Poland, which was for ever united to the Empire. Poland is certainly now nothing but a Russian province and is subjected to Russian laws, but we most emphatically ask M. Ordin, even if he were so inclined, not to draw any conclusions for the position of Finland from this circumstance, till he can point out events in this

country, analogous with those which led to the abolition of the Polish Constitution.

Clause I of the Vienna Congress Act contains information on another subject. It recognised the Duchy of Warsaw as a State with a separate Constitution, and Alexander adopted the title of King of Poland, just as he had earlier recognised Finland as a State (état) with a Constitution of its own,¹ and adopted the title of Grand Duke of Finland. The Congress Act, however, calls the inhabitants of the re-established kingdom of Poland „sujets de la Russie“, obviously in order to show that, relating to foreign countries, Poland was only a part, a province, of the Russian Empire. This proves how unjustifiable is M. Ordin's attempt to turn to account the circumstance, that Alexander I in a letter to Napoleon, in the spring of 1808, calls Finland a „province russe“, and also in the manifesto of June 17th, concerning the union of Finland with the Russian Empire, mentions Finland as a province. Without taking notice of the circumstance, that these documents belong to a period, when the Emperor had not yet definitely resolved what position to give Finland in the Russian Empire, it is wrong to consider the expression „province“ according to the usage of the time, as incompatible with the confirmation of Finland's separate Constitution. It is as wrong as it would be, if some one, because of the

¹ Cf. page 7.

words „sujets de la Russie“ in the Vienna Congress Act, maintained that this Act did not recognise Poland as a State, and did not give the Poles a Constitution of their own.

While denying that the Emperor at all confirmed and ratified the Constitution of Finland, M. Ordin tries to prove, that at any rate the Swedish Constitution of that time, consisting of the „Form of Government“ of 1772 and of the „Act of Union and Security“ of 1789, was never confirmed. The reasons he assigns for this opinion are no more convincing than his former sophisms.

He refers to a conversation between Speransky, the former President of the Deputation, Mannerheim, and another Finnish Nobleman, von Morian, which took place on the day before the ceremony in the Borgo Cathedral. According to Mannerheim's journal, as reported by Castrén, Speransky, during the conversation, observed that certain statutes in the „Form of Government“ of 1772 and in the Act of Union and Security of 1789, which Acts Mannerheim and von Morian considered „the real fundamental laws of Finland, which His Majesty had promised to maintain“ were not „suitable“ for Finland in its present circumstances. M. Ordin represents this incident as an unsuccessful attempt of the Finns to get the two Acts specially mentioned in the Emperor's declaration (II, 355). Therefore he passes over in silence the circumstance that Mannerheim,

rendered uneasy by a rumour that the Emperor did not intend to confirm the „Form of Government“ of 1772, late at night betook himself to Speransky. Here the declaration of the Emperor to confirm the fundamental laws, as well as the rights and privileges of all the Estates, was placed in his hands. „Well pleased and comforted“, says Mannerheim, „I went quietly home“. ¹

Adhering to Speransky's remark, M. Ordin points out several rules and statutes in the Swedish fundamental laws, which the Imperial Assurance could not possibly refer to, and from this circumstance he draws the conclusion, that these laws were not at all confirmed. He attains this object by mentioning statutes as being in force in 1809, which were wholly or in part repealed by the Act of 1789. Such is, for instance, the case with the formulary for the Royal Declaration, containing the promise of the Sovereign to maintain the fundamental laws, which was adopted in Sweden at the Diet of 1778, and the text of which he copies and sets down as humiliating for every Russian Monarch (II, 352, and the appendices II, 47). Already at the coronation of Gustavus IV Adolphus this formulary was only used in a modified form. All this is, however, of less consequence, for the fundamental laws of Sweden in 1809 did certainly contain provisions, which could not be valid in Fin-

¹ Castrén, „Skildringar“ p. 141.

land, after its union with the Russian Empire. To these belongs the Decree in § 1 of the „Form of Government“ of 1772 that the Monarch must be an adherent of the Lutheran faith, as well as § 3 of the same Act, which prescribes that: „The order of Succession to the throne remains such as it was decided in the Act of Succession passed and sanctioned in Stockholm in the year 1743“. Through the separation of Finland from Sweden provisions and decrees of this kind were naturally annulled. That the Estates of Finland, when they greeted the Russian Emperor as their Grand Duke, recognised these changes in the fundamental laws, was already in 1809 fully understood. M. Ordin is the first to hit upon the idea of quoting those paragraphs as instances of the practicability or not of the Swedish Constitution for Finland (II 315, cf. 337).

Provisions of this kind did not cause any difficulties, when the laws that had been in force here after 1809 came to be determined. Laws which had been made for Finland and Sweden together did of course contain provisions which could not be applied to Finland alone, partly because many of the institutions they presuppose were not in existence here in 1809, nor were some of them even later on established. The difficulty which thus arose could be completely solved, only by a modification and revision of the laws, undertaken by the Monarch and the Estates in common, as prescribed by the fundamental law. This, although

proposed to be done already in 1809 and several times later on, was always put off, hence there naturally remained some uncertainty on several points. It cannot be denied that this uncertainty in many cases, during the first years after the union with Russia, caused an extension of the Sovereign's power, the decision depending on the interpretation of the law or regulation in question agreed to by the Monarch and his advisers. Had M. Ordin pointed out this fact, we should have had no remark to make. But he goes much farther. When in a weak moment he takes into consideration the possibility — which he has so often before refuted — of Alexander having intended to confirm certain statutes of the Swedish Constitution, he immediately makes haste to add that since these were not specially mentioned in the Assurance — „everything remained dependent on the Emperor's pleasure“ (II, 337). In other words: The Emperor confirms the rights and liberties which every Estate in particular, and all the inhabitants in general, had hitherto enjoyed „promising to maintain these privileges firm and unshaken in their full force“, but this assurance is a nullity, because these liberties and rights, these laws and statutes have not been specially mentioned in the Act of Assurance. The author who ventures to give utterance to such absurdities cannot, surely, have a particularly high opinion of his readers' discernment.

It would be unnecessary indeed to waste time by collecting evidences of the fact that the „Form of

Government" of 1772 and the „Act of Union and Security" of 1789 are the fundamental laws to which the Emperor's declaration most specially referred. Just in them all the rights and liberties enjoyed by the Finnish people are most completely and distinctly set forth. If there were any further proof wanted to confirm this, it would be furnished by the circumstance that the Government have continually referred to these laws ever since Finland was united with Russia. How the Estates in 1809 understood the matter a look at their protocols, where the Acts of 1772 and of 1789 are ¹ often mentioned, will sufficiently prove. When the Order of Peasants, in ^{April 1}_{March 20} commenced their discussion of the Imperial propositions, „the Form of Government of Aug. 21, 1772, the Act of Union and Security of Feb. 21, and of April 4, 1789, the Royal Declaration of the rights and liberties of the Peasantry of April 4 in the same year, and the Law on the Diet of Jan. 24, 1617, and other statutes to be observed during the deliberations", were read aloud.

¹ It appears from the authorities M. Ordin quotes, as well as from the contents of his work, that he does not know more from these protocols than Castrén's description contains. He avers (II, 346) that of the speeches made at the opening of the Diet by the Speakers of the Estates, only those by the Bishop Tengström, and by the peasant Klockars are in existence. The speech made by the Marshal of the House of Nobles, however, as well as that by the Speaker of the Order of Burgesses are, in fact, printed in the protocols of the respective Estates.

As a further proof that Alexander did not confirm, for Finland, the Constitution of 1772, M. Ordin mentions the circumstance that the memorial of Jägerhorn of Feb. 26, 1809 concerning the elaboration of a new Constitution for Finland led to no result. (II, 387, etc.) He does not inform his readers how he arrives at this conclusion, but quotes instead a letter from Speransky to de Geer of June 6, 1809 where the former positively calls upon the Marshal of the House of Nobles to limit the discussions of the Estates to the Imperial propositions. We give the letter from the original French: „Nothing strange to these propositions“, says Speransky, „must be admitted for discussion; such has always been the intention of His Imperial Majesty, and though there still remain to be decided many matters of great interest for the welfare of the country, and particularly for the solidity of its Constitution: but these matters are of a nature to be most carefully considered, before being proposed for discussion of the Estates, and nothing being yet prepared for this work all questions of this kind must be for the moment carefully put aside. Your Excellency admitted the justice of this observation when I had the honour of talking to you at St. Petersburg and Borgo about the proposal of a reform of the Constitution, made by M. Jägerhorn“. ¹

¹ „Rien d'étranger à ces propositions ne sera admis à la discussion; telles ont toujours été les intentions de S. M. I. et quoiqu'il se présente encore plusieurs matières très intéressantes à régler pour le bien du pays, et surtout pour la solidité de sa

M. Ordin remarks about this letter (II, 390), that it „shows the amount of significance due to the Diet at Borgo, and to the expressions, which the Emperor let fall, *en passant*, [!] in order to give a sort of confirmation to the Constitution“. Soon after he adds that the letter need not be commented upon. That is quite true. Speransky pronounces it to be the Emperor's wish, that all questions concerning a reform of Finland's Constitution (*la constitution du pays*) should be put aside for the time being (*pour le moment*) as not having been sufficiently prepared. Hence the Constitution, the existence of which is recognised, and the revision of which is referred to as a future event, remains unchanged such as it is contained in the old laws, and the reader draws from the letter the conclusion that the Emperor's and Speransky's real

Constitution: mais ces matières sont de nature à être mûrement approfondies avant que de les proposer à la discussion des états, et comme rien n'est encore préparé pour ce travail, ces sortes de questions doivent être pour le moment soigneusement écartées. V. Exc. est convenue elle même de la justice de cette observation lorsque j'ai eu l'honneur de l'entretenir à Pétersbourg et à Borgo sur le projet de réforme de la Constitution, proposé par M. Jegerhorn“. — The prohibition to adopt for discussion any subject, not mentioned in the Imperial propositions, did not by any means touch the right of the Estates, according to the fundamental law, to do so by means of a petition to the Emperor. In a letter to de Geer, of April 20, Speransky himself recommended this method, and in 1809 the Estates, conjointly as well as separately, submitted petitions to the Government on the most different subjects.

intentions were diametrically opposed to those M. Ordin assigns to them.

The reader has already some knowledge of the invectives M. Ordin heaps upon the Russian statesmen who were not, when Finland was concerned, prompted by the same desire to destroy, and by the same hatred of free and liberal institutions, which distinguish his work. We have also seen, that he does not even spare the person of the Monarch. All hints however of Alexander's incapacity as a statesman, of his ignorance of the Scriptures, etc, are outdone by the following accusation: „By confirming the Swedish Constitution as the fundamental law of this country (Finland), Alexander would not only have acted against his sacred duty to Russia, — a duty he had at his coronation solemnly acknowledged before the face of God — but he would also have placed himself in a downright hostile position to the Empire“ (II, 337).

M. Ordin then accuses the Emperor of having broken the oath he swore at his coronation, for though he puts it into a hypothetical form, the accusation is there, all the same. And as we have seen, the fact that Alexander confirmed for Finland the Constitution which formerly belonged to Sweden and Finland in common, remains indisputable. He did this also before the face of God, or to use his own words, in the Temple of the Most High „dans le sanctuaire de l'Etre Suprême“, and he did it, not by word of mouth alone, but in a solemn „Act of Assurance“, which he signed

and delivered into the custody of the Estates. In his speeches to the Estates, and in his manifestoes to the people of Finland during the Borgo Diet, as well as later on, he several times acknowledged all the significance of this act, all the duties it involved. M. Ordin knows all this, but he reasons nevertheless: *If* Alexander had confirmed the Constitution of Finland, then he would have broken his coronation oath, i. e. in plain words, if he has done, what he has actually done, then he had committed perjury. But that is not all. Alexander's successors, the Emperors Nicholas, Alexander II, and Alexander III, have all of them sworn to maintain Finland's Constitution, and M. Ordin's accusation is accordingly directed against them also. It is fortunate for the author that he was cautious enough to clothe the accusation in a hypothetical form, that he has the *if* to fall back upon.

And to this work a prize has been awarded by the Imperial Academy of Science!

The debates which began immediately after the oath of allegiance had been taken, are of great moment for the internal organisation, but not very important in respect of the relations of Finland to Russia. Therefore we will but slightly refer to those chapters in M. Ordin's book, which treat of this period; we are quite justified in so doing because the author does not enter into details except on a few questions.

He divests the judgment of the Estates on the questions put before them of every significance as binding resolutions; they were, according to him, only expressions of opinion which the Emperor heeded or not, just as it pleased him. In support of this opinion he quotes certain points in the propositions and in Speransky's letter, where the latter refers to the „avis“ of the Estates. When M. Ordin afterwards finds in de Geer's report to the Emperor of April 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ the innocent word „décisions“ used about the resolutions of the Estates, he insinuates, with a sneer, that de Geer and his colleagues had stealthily introduced the word into their report, „which the Emperor of course would not read very attentively“ and „so they attained their well known aim“ (II, 367—368). Does M. Ordin suppose that these same men smuggled into Speransky's letter to de Geer of $\frac{\text{May } 21}{\text{June } 2}$ the expression „conclusions définitives“ referring to the same thing, or into Speransky's letter to Sprengtporten of April 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ the passage where he points out that the advantage of leaving to a committee, composed of members of the Estates, the work of preparing a proposal for the arrangement of the future government in this country, lay in the fact that the *consent* of the Estates would thus be most easily ensured, (par là son consentement en sera plus sûr)? It is, however, a fact that an examination according to this method leads to no result. During the time of Gustavus III the expression „avis“ („ut-låtande“) was constantly applied to the reports the

Estates addressed to the King, whether the Monarch, according to law, was entitled to settle the matter alone, or not.¹ Hence it ought not to cause astonishment, that the same expression was used at the Borgo Diet concerning all the replies of the Estates to His Majesty's propositions, nor is it of any consequence whatever to the question, to what extent these replies possessed legal force and efficiency, or not. His Majesty had confirmed the fundamental laws of Finland: the necessary consequence of this fact is that the legal character of the resolution of the Estates in every separate case depended on the right these fundamental laws, according to the nature of the case, awarded to the Estates. A careful study of the documents, executed

¹ We quote, as a particularly fitting example of this, § 3 of the Bill of the Diet of 1786: „After having considered what the §§ 40, 41, 42, 43 and 57 determine, and the Law on the Diet of 1617 not having been adopted for observance in those parts, wherein it has been changed through the Form of Government, we have unanimously come to the conclusion; that in matters demanding the *opinion* (utlåtande) of the Estates of the realm, except in cases concerning privileges and supply, for which there are special rules in the same law, there is the unanimous majority of three Estates wanted, in order to constitute the vote of the Diet; but where two Estates remain against two the matter falls through and remains on the old footing“. That this rule really related to questions on which the Estates had the same rights as the Monarch appears distinctly already from the first of the above quoted paragraphs, § 40 of the Form of Government of 1772 which runs: „The King may not frame a new law, or abolish an old one, without the knowledge and consent of the Estates“.

désirs et les sentimens de la nation sur ses véritables intérêts.

J'appelai votre attention sur les objets les plus importans à votre prospérité. Me reposant entièrement sur la loyauté de votre caractère, fort d'ailleurs de la pureté de Mes intentions, J'ai laissé à vos délibérations une parfaite liberté. Aucune influence, aucune autorité étrangère à la vôtre n'osa franchir le seuil de ces portes. J'ai veillé sur l'indépendance de vos opinions. Absent, Je Me trouvois au milieu de vous par les vœux que Je ne cessois de faire pour le succès de vos travaux.

Les avis que vous venez d'émettre portent le caractère de la sagesse et de l'amour de la patrie. Je les prendrai en considération dans l'oeuvre importante que Je médite pour votre prospérité.

Vos travaux cessent dès ce moment. Mais en vous séparant vous avez des devoirs essentiels à remplir.

Portez dans le sein de vos provinces, imprimez dans l'esprit de vos compatriotes la même confiance qui a présidé ici à vos délibérations. Inspirez-leur la même conviction, la même assurance sur les objets les plus importans à votre existence politique: le maintien de

and sentiments of the nation touching its true interests.

I have called your attention to the most important objects to secure your prosperity. Trusting wholly to the loyalty of your character, strong, moreover, in the purity of my intentions, I have allowed you perfect liberty in your deliberations. No extraneous influence nor authority has dared to cross the threshold of these portals. I have kept watch over the independence of your opinions. Absent I was ever in your midst by the prayers that I never ceased to offer up for the success of your labours.

The opinions to which you have just given utterance bear the stamp of wisdom and of love for fatherland. I shall take them into consideration in the important work that I am contemplating for your prosperity.

Your labours cease from this moment. But in separating, you have essential duties to perform.

Carry into the distant parts of your provinces, impress on the minds of your compatriots, that same confidence which has presided over your deliberations here. Inspire them with the same assurance concerning the most important objects of your political existence, the maintenance of your laws, the security

à votre existence politique“. Referring to the Finnish people, he continued „placé désormais au rang des nations, sous l'empire de ses loix“. It lay neither in Alexander's, nor in any human power to give the Finnish people a place among the nations from an ethnographical point of view, for they had been in possession of such a place since the earliest dawn of the Middle Ages — but it did lie in his power to give it a political existence of its own. This and nothing less was his intention. He declared that the Finnish people should be, under the protection of their laws, „*libre dans l'intérieur*“, independent in their interior government of all laws and authorities, except their own. Mark well however: independent only in this respect. The Emperor does not promise Finland any independence with reference to Foreign Powers. All his promises are based on the theory, that Finland stands, not in a personal, but in an indissoluble union with Russia, that it forms a part, a subdivision of the Empire with reference to Foreign Powers, though not with reference to legislation and administrative government. In accordance with this theory, the Estates declared their allegiance to Alexander, not only as Grand Duke of Finland, but also as Sovereign of the Empire. In the Cathedral, on March 29, after the Emperor had delivered his assurance and the Estates had taken the oath, which he accepted „with tender emotion“, a Herald standing before the throne proclaimed: Long live Alexander I,

culture which began to arouse in the people a consciousness of their own national interests, which in many points diverged from those of Sweden. Perhaps Finland in the course of time, even in her old circumstances, as forming a part of the Swedish monarchy, might have acquired the independence in the management of her interior affairs which was absolutely necessary for their growth and development. But anyhow the international political situation in the North, such as it was after the struggle between Peter the Great and Charles XII, made such a development quite impossible. Russia pushed forward to the Gulf of Bothnia, and after having twice occupied Finland, the Russian armies were again in 1809 in possession of the country, this time up to the northern frontier. If the conquest became permanent, the conqueror had it in his power to try to nip in the bud the culture which was compatible with the customs and the disposition of the Finnish people, and to force this people into a social order, foreign to its nature and paralysing its energy. But Alexander the Beloved, „le Bien-aimé“, did not found his ideal of a Sovereign on the ruins of individual happiness or on the shattered hopes of nations. By giving Finland internal independence he rendered possible the expansion of her people's inherent strength, and the material and intellectual progress this century has witnessed here, and which has probably never been equalled in any country so far north and with so cold

Alexander's humane and lofty mind, but also of the demands of the military and political situation.

Since the beginning of the war an expedition against Sweden proper had been planned in St. Petersburg. A few days before the opening of the Diet the first attempt was made, but unsuccessfully. The Emperor was, however, firmly determined to renew it, and the second attack led to the conclusion of the war. But what if the popular risings, which had raged in Finland during the previous year, had been repeated now, when there were hardly any Russian troops left in the country. And if they had been supported by the Swedish, possibly even by the English fleet? No chauvinism, however shortsighted it may be, can deny that the situation of the Russian army would then have been very critical, especially as the war between Turkey and Russia was still going on. The situation became quite different as soon as the pacification of Finland was insured. This object, which was so necessary for the success of further measures, was attained in the same moment that the Emperor, in his declaration to the Estates, promised to maintain the Constitution of Finland. From that moment, the union with the Russian Empire did not seem, to the Finnish people, synonymous with the annihilation of their most precious rights, but appeared as the commencement of a higher phase in the development of their political existence.

The difficulties also, which Russian policy had to conquer in Northern Europe, would have been

supposed that Sweden would remain neutral in such a struggle. The bleeding wounds left by the war that was hardly concluded would surely, under ordinary circumstances, incite her to join the foes of Russia. Then the attack against St. Petersburg, planned by Gustavus III, might perhaps be brought into execution at the same time when the Russian armies would have to meet the French legions Napoleon would hurl against the second capital, Moscow. What a relief then for Russia, if she could be confident that the Finns were faithful and did not long to renew their union with Sweden. If such were the case the Swedish attack would be rendered harmless, nay, even impossible, for without the assistance of the Finns, or in spite of their resistance, Sweden could never hope to regain what she had lost. Moreover, the very thought of a fight between Swedes and Finns would have been impossible to the men of that generation. We need

leon: „Alexandre et Napoléon d'après leur correspondance inédite“ says in the Sept. number of 1890:

„L'entrevue d'Erfurt apparut aux yeux des contemporains comme l'apogée de l'entente pacifique et amicale établie entre les deux souverains de Russie et de France. L'histoire doit l'envisager sous un point de vue différent. Elle constate notamment qu'il s'y est déjà produit un certain relâchement des liens fermés à Tilsit, et cela pour des raisons diverses, dont quelques-unes incombent à Napoléon, les autres à Alexandre“. — — — „Dans les réticences de Napoléon, Alexandre voyait percer un germe de défiance qui engendrait des soupçons assez vagues encore dans son propre esprit“.

V. FROM THE BORGO DIET TILL THE PRESENT TIME.

Through the manifesto of June $\frac{1}{17}$, 1808, the Emperor had informed Finland's inhabitants of his firm resolve to unite their country to the Russian Empire. Through their representatives the people of Finland had concurred in the union, and had sworn fealty to Alexander as Grand Duke of their country and Sovereign of the Empire. But there was still wanted an acknowledgment from the King of Sweden, that his former right to Finland was now conferred upon the Emperor of Russia.

It might be said, that Sweden, a few days before the opening of the Borgo Diet, had indirectly recognised the separation of Finland. By the revolution in Stockholm of March 13, 1809, the last Swedish King, to whom the people of Finland had sworn allegiance, was dethroned, and the Regency did not summon representatives from the Grand Duchy to the Diet, which was convoked immediately after the revolution, by this omission acknowledging the right of the Finnish people to choose for themselves. When the Swedish Crown, at the treaty of Fredrikshamn

land. M. Ordin did not or would not perceive, that the final issue of this question, as well as the motives pleaded by Rummyantsoff, distinctly prove, that the treaty also invested the solemn act in Borgo Cathedral with a significance which does not at all accord with his own representation of facts. And yet in a letter to the Emperor, dated Fredrikshamn ^{Aug. 28}/_{Sept. 9}, Rummyantsoff writes: „In concluding this despatch I must inform Your Majesty, that when Baron Stedingk¹ often and urgently talked of the necessity of inserting a clause, pledging the maintenance of the Religion, laws and privileges of Finland, as well as the security of private property, I refused to discuss such a clause, because all this belonged to the internal administration, and could not be treated as an object for a diplomatic agreement. In support of his opinion Baron Stedingk named several treaties wherein the Power which cedes a province makes certain stipulations to the advantage of the subjects over whom it renounces all rights. I admitted that his quotations were just, but found no difficulty in showing him how little analogy there was between earlier acquisitions and that lately made by Your Majesty. Your Majesty had won the love of the Finnish people, had appeared among them as their Sovereign before the treaty, had even personally received their oath of allegiance, and had as their lawful Monarch, opened their Diet. This

¹ The principal Swedish negotiator.

Count Rumyantsoff was, as is well known, no friend of the concessions Alexander had made to the Finns, hence M. Ordin praises this statesman as the only Russian patriot among all the advisers of Alexander. But even Rumyantsoff did not hesitate to represent the way in which the Emperor had acquired Finland as differing from ordinary conquests. He tried to prove that even before the conclusion of peace, the Emperor's right to this country was not only that of an ordinary conqueror, but also that of a lawful Monarch. In support of this opinion he refers to the events in Borgo: the Emperor's appearance there, and the oath of allegiance the Estates had there taken to him. From this point of view it was naturally consistent to exclude from the treaty every other guarantee of the laws of Finland, except a mention of the assurance which the Emperor had already issued.

The sixth clause in the treaty of Fredrikshamn was at last accepted by both parties in this form: „Since His Majesty the Emperor of Russia has given the most

Sköldebrandt seul a remis depuis à monsieur d'Alopeus un projet qu'il venoit de faire de cet article, croyant, disoit-il, l'avoir rédigé de manière à pouvoir concilier mon principe et leurs instances.

Ce projet est sous la lettre C. Je n'ai rien répondu encore, mais je préviens V. M. qu'avec un très léger changement je me propose de l'admettre. Il n'affoiblit en rien, au contraire, il donne force et valeur à la dignité de mon principe qui étoit de montrer V. M. comme Maître de la Finlande avant le traité“. Appendices of M. Ordin's work, II, 143.

tration générale *Nous* a paru d'une nécessité urgente. Il importoit au bien-être de l'Etat que les administrations provinciales eussent un point central, un tribunal suprême qui pût les diriger, maintenir l'unité de principes, assurer la force et l'action de la loi, veiller à la distribution de la Justice et imprimer un mouvement salulaire à la propagation des lumières et aux progrès de l'industrie.

Une commission spéciale, formée de citoyens de la Finlande, distingués par leurs lumières et leurs vues patriotiques, fut appelée à combiner les élémens de cette institution d'après les principes que *Nous* lui avons prescrit. Ayant examiné ce travail et après lui avoir donné toute l'étendue d'utilité dont il étoit susceptible, *Nous* l'avons proposé à la délibération de la Diète.

Ayant entendu les avis des Etats et considérant qu'une administration générale, revêtue d'une autorité suffisante pour le maintien des loix et basée sur des principes libéraux, ne manquera pas d'exercer la plus salulaire influence sur le bien-être de l'Etat *Nous* avons décrété et décrétons ce qui suit“.

be of the most urgent necessity. The welfare of the State demanded that the provincial administrations should have a central point, a supreme tribunal to direct them, to maintain the unity of principles, to give force and validity to the laws, to watch over the administration of justice and to impart a salutary impulse to the propagation of knowledge and the progress of industry.

A special committee of Finnish citizens distinguished by their knowledge and their patriotism was appointed to draw up the outlines of this institution in accordance with the principles laid down by *Us*. After having examined their work and after having imparted to it all the extension of usefulness that was possible, *We* have submitted it to the deliberation of the Diet.

Having heard the opinion of the Estates on the subject, and considering that a general administration possessed of sufficient authority to maintain the laws and based on liberal principles, will not fail to exercise the most salutary influence on the well-being of the State *We* have ratified and furthermore ratify the following“.

M. Ordin this time abstains from making comments. He does not even inform his readers how this docu-

réunion de la Diète, la formation du Conseil de Régence au sein de la nation, la conservation intacte de l'ordre judiciaire et administratif, en sont des preuves qui doivent assurer à la nation finnoise les droits de son existence politique“.

nation, the keeping intact the judicial and administrative order, afford proofs sufficient to assure the Finnish people of its political existence and the rights appertaining thereto.¹

¹ The reader will remember that the Emperor, in the speech with which he opened the Diet in Borgo had already said: „Cette réunion fera époque dans votre existence politique“. And in the speech that concluded the Diet, on July 7-19 1809, he mentioned „les objets les plus importants à votre existence politique“. The importance he attached to these reiterated expressions about Finland's political existence is further proved by the gracious private letter to Major General, Baron — afterwards Count — J. F. Aminoff, which was the Emperor's answer to the Finnish officers' humble expressions of gratitude for the advantages which the manifesto of March 17 1810 conferred on them. The letter — kept at Count Aminoff's country seat, Rilax, in Finland — dated and signed by the Emperor himself, runs thus: Monsieur le general major Baron d'Aminof, j'agréé avec beaucoup de plaisir les sentimens de reconnoissance que vous venez d'exprimer au nom des braves officiers de l'armée finnoise. En fixant leur sort, j'ai voulu prouver combien il m'est agréable de voir cimenter les liens qui les attachent à leur patrie. Mon but est rempli du moment qu'ils reconnoissent le motif qui me fait agir: c'est de voir se consolider l'existence politique de la nation finnoise et d'accroître les moyens de sa prospérité. Sur ce je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait, monsieur le Baron d'Aminof, en sa sainte garde.

St. Pétersbourg

Alexandre.

ce 26 Avril

1810.

ные законы“ state which questions depend on the decision of the Emperor, or in other words determine the rights, as well as the duties, of the Monarch.

In reuniting to Finland the province of Viborg, which had belonged to Russia since the treaties of Nyslott and Abo, Alexander fulfilled a wish which had been expressed already by the Finnish Independence party during the reign of Catherine II. He thus made it possible for this province, which during the 18th century had been suffering under an administration, foreign to it in every respect, to recover from its decadence under laws and institutions identical with its earlier history. This measure also united the whole of Finland, more firmly than ever, in the bonds of gratitude and self-interest, to the Emperor — and this at a period when the rupture with France seemed near at hand. One of the Imperial Statutes concerning the reunion of Viborg, dated ^{Dec. 31 1811}_{Jan. 12 1812} is illustrative of the Emperor's attitude towards the Constitution of Finland, wherein is this resolution inserted by the Emperor with his own hand: „In the province of Viborg the right of the Estates of sending representatives to the Diet is to be decided in accordance with the prescriptions in the Constitution of Finland“. (Въ Конституціи Великаго Княжества Финляндіи).

We now quote in full the gracious Decree of ³/₂₁ Feb. 1816, the importance and significance of which the reader was partly informed of, in the beginning of this work.

WE ALEXANDER I by the grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias and Grand Duke of Finland etc. etc. declare to all people:

From the very union of the Grand Duchy of Finland with *Our* Empire the prosperity of this country has always formed one of the most agreeable objects of *Our* wishes and care. Conformably with which all *Our* endeavours have *We* on every occasion turned to that end, that *Our* Finnish subjects by *Our* acts, directed solely to the common good, might be disposed to the fidelity and attachment which *We*, invested by Providence with Supreme power over them, had a right to expect from them and of both of which to *Our* particular pleasure, *We* have seen many undoubted proofs. Assured that the Constitution and the laws which, adapted to the customs, education and spirit of the Finnish people from distant times, formed the base of its civic liberty and organisation, could not without risk be limited or changed, *We* on assuming the sovereignty over this country have not only in the most solemn manner confirmed the Constitution and the Laws, and on the foundation of these to every Finnish citizen his special rights and prerogatives, but *We* have also formed a special Governing Council consisting of native Finlanders, which till now has administered the civic department of this country and resolved the judicial affairs, as a last appeal, independently of any other authority, except that of the laws and of *Our* sovereign will conforming to the same.

Having by such means shown the good disposition, which *We* had, and which *We* will have in future, towards *Our* most loyal Finnish subjects, *We* have deigned to confirm for all time the promise given by *Us* concerning the preservation of a separate Constitution to this country under *Our* sceptre and that of *Our* Heirs.

And now, on the happy termination, together with the Powers allied to *Us*, and with the help of the Almighty, of the affairs concerning the safety of *Our* Empire, and relating to the tranquillity of all Europe, and having found the long-awaited opportunity, to devote without hindrance from foreign cares, *Our* activity to the internal affairs of *Our* Empire, and in their number those referring especially to Finland, *We* find it most convenient, to mark more clearly *Our* determination with respect to the aforesaid Local Government of this country and its immediate relation to *Our* person, in accordance with the denomination of the Supreme Government in *Our* Empire and in the Kingdom of Poland lately connected with it, to give to the Finnish Supreme Government the name of *Our* Senate for Finland, without change, however, in its actual composition, and still less in the Constitution and laws by *Us* ratified for Finland and herewith confirmed still further and in all respects. On *Our* most solemn promise, to choose in future as members of this *Our* Finnish Senate, as has been the case hitherto, solely native Finlanders or those domiciled there and

At the solemn Act in Borgo Cathedral the Emperor made his declaration as the possessor and the representative of the sovereign power of the united countries. The Estates of Finland, on the other hand, took the oath of allegiance to the Emperor and Grand Duke in the name of the then living and of all the coming generations of the Finnish people. None of the declarations and oaths that the Sovereign and the people have afterwards exchanged, can therefore be looked upon as possessing constituent power, either considering the relations between Finland and Russia, or concerning the position of the Monarch to the Finnish Constitution. They only give expression to what would have been valid and in force without them, as having been for ever settled, at the time of the union between Finland and the Empire. The once and for ever confirmed Constitution, however, implies an obligation for the people of Finland to take the oath of allegiance to each new Monarch that succeeds to the throne, but it also demands that every Emperor, on his succession to the throne, should issue an assurance of maintaining the laws of the country. Such an assurance has in fact been made by all the Successors of Alexander.

The Emperor Nicholas' declaration of Dec ½, in 1825 is similar to that of Alexander, with the exception of the words: „Providence having placed Us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland“, which have been exchanged for „By the will of Providence, having come into hereditary possession of

a translation of the Russian „утвержденные Намн ко-
ренные законы и основныя ностановленія“. Here then
we find the expression „основные“ which M. Ordin
missed in the Emperor Alexander's assurance. He
based his opinion, that this assurance did not involve
a confirmation of the Constitution, on the circumstance
that instead of the aforesaid expression, only the word
„коренные“ was used. Nicholas, however, whose decla-
ration to the inhabitants of Finland is exactly like
that of Alexander, formally and repeatedly declared
that he confirmed the „основные“ as well as the „ко-
ренные законы“ of the country. When M. Ordin's book
first appeared a critic remarked, not without reason,
that Alexander issued declaration after declaration, one
more comprehensive and distinct than the other, quite
as if he had foreseen, that there would one day arise
a M. Ordin to distort and pervert all his expressions,
however distinct and unmistakeable they may have
been. It is a remark to the point also concerning the
declarations and decrees published by the Emperor
Nicholas.

In connection with M. Ordin's remark about the
word „Constitution“ having been used, in Alexander's
declaration, in the plural, we read (II, 340): „In order
to make impossible for the future, an abuse of the
hardly perceptible difference between the expressions

Grand Dukes Alexander, Wladimir and Alexei Alexandrovitch and Nicholas Constantinovitch".¹

Représentants du Grand-Duché de Finlande.

En Vous voyant réunis autour de Moi, je suis heureux d'avoir pu accomplir Mes vœux et vos espérances.

Mon attention s'est dès longtemps portée sur un certain nombre de questions successivement soulevées et qui touchent aux intérêts les plus sérieux du pays. Elles sont restées en suspens vu que leur solution demandoit la coopération des Etats. Des considérations majeures, dont l'appréciation M'est réservée, ne M'avoient pas permis de réunir les représentants des quatre ordres du Grand-Duché durant les premières années de Mon règne. Néanmoins J'ai pris à tems des mesures préparatoires pour arriver à ce but, et aujourd'hui que les circonstances ne sont plus de nature à motiver un plus long ajournement, Je Vous ai convoqués, afin de Vous faire part, après avoir préalablement entendu Mon Sénat de Finlande, des projets de loi et de quelques affaires administratives, dont Vous aurez à Vous occuper du-

Representatives of the Grand Duchy of Finland.

In seeing you assembled around Me I am glad to have been able to fulfil My desire and your hopes.

My attention has long been directed to a certain number of questions successively raised, which concern the most serious interests of your country. These questions have remained in suspense, because their solution required the cooperation of the Estates. Certain important considerations, the appreciation of which is reserved for Me, prevented Me from convening the representatives of the four orders of the Grand Duchy during the first years of My reign. Nevertheless I took in good time some preparatory steps to attain this object, and now that circumstances are no longer of a nature to cause a further postponement, I have convoked you, in order to lay before you, after having previously heard the report of My Senate of Finland, the projected measures and administrative business which will require your atten-

¹ Of Russian Ministers there were present among others the Minister for Foreign Affairs Prince Gortchakoff and the Minister of War, Milyutin.

Vous fera voir que les revenus actuels de l'État suffisent pour amortir cette dette avec ses intérêts. Mon desir est toutefois qu'à l'avenir aucun nouvel emprunt ne soit fait sans la participation des États du Grand Duché, à moins qu'une invasion inopinée de l'ennemi ou quelque autre malheur public imprévu ne Nous en fasse une nécessité.

Les nouvelles contributions que Je fais proposer à la Diète tendent à réaliser différentes mesures destinées à augmenter le bien-être du pays et à faire prospérer l'enseignement du peuple. C'est à Vous à décider de l'urgence et de l'étendue de ces mesures.

Plusieurs des stipulations des lois fondamentales du Grand-Duché ne sont plus applicables à l'état des choses survenu depuis sa réunion à l'Empire; d'autres manquent de clarté et de précision. Désirant remédier à ces imperfections, Mon intention est de faire élaborer un projet a loi qui contiendra des explications et des supplémens à ces stipulations pour être soumis à l'examen des États lors de la prochaine Diète, que je pense convoquer dans trois ans. En maintenant le principe Monarchique constitutionnel inhérent aux moeurs du peuple Finlandois et dont toutes ses

loans will likewise be communicated to you and will show, that the present revenue of the State is sufficient to gradually pay off the debt with its interest. It is my wish, however, that for the future no new loan be raised without the consent of the Grand Duchy, unless an unexpected invasion by an enemy or some other unforeseen national calamity should make it a necessity for Us.

The new taxes that I propose to the Diet are designed to carry out different measures destined to augment the welfare of the country, and to advance the cause of popular education. You have to decide as to the urgency and extent of these measures.

Many provisions of the fundamental laws of the Grand Duchy are no longer applicable to the state of affairs existing since its union with the Empire; others lack clearness and precision. Desirous of remedying these imperfections it is My intention to have a measure carefully prepared which shall contain explanations and supplements. These will be submitted to the consideration of the Estates at the next Diet, which I purpose convoking three years hence. Whilst maintaining the principle of a Constitutional Monarchy agreeably to the an-

un danger, deviennent une garantie d'ordre et de prospérité.

Je déclare ouverte la présente Diète.

vereign, in a practical manner for the development of its well-being, liberal institutions, far from being a danger, become a guarantee of order and prosperity.

I declare the present Diet open.

Instead of commenting upon this speech, where Finland's noble benefactor, and rightly, pronounced these words: „None of my acts has been such as to interfere with the good understanding, that ought to exist between the Sovereign and the nation“, we will quote the decree wherein the Emperor approved and confirmed „the Law on the Diet“, adopted by the Estates in 1867:

„Reserving for Ourselves Our rights and privileges, such as they are confirmed and assured in the „Form of Government“ of August 21, 1772 and in the „Act of Union and Security“ of February 21 and April 3 1789, and which have not been formally changed in the aforesaid „Law on the Diet“, We approve and confirm this „Law on the Diet“ as an irrevocable fundamental law, („ненарушимый основной закон“). In faith whereof We have to this set Our hand and seal. St, Petersburg April 3-15 1869.

There still remains the Gracious Assurance of our present Emperor and Grand Duke to all the inhabitants of Finland, given in St. Petersburg on March 1st, 1881:

ander Pavlovitch, of most glorious memory, had bestowed upon Finland, and which Our late and beloved Father, His Majesty the Emperor Alexander Nikolaievitch, in co-operation with the Estates of Finland, further developed, We did this with great satisfaction, having in mind the manifold proofs of unfailing affection and gratitude to their Monarch and benefactor that the inhabitants of this country have displayed, and with which they have brightened the reign of Our ever remembered Father, who always had their welfare at heart.

We command you to announce this to Our faithful Finnish subjects.

St. Petersburg March $\frac{1}{4}$ 1881.

As containing a further exposition of the principles, according to which our present Emperor and Grand Duke had resolved to govern this country, we will insert here the introduction of the Speech with which he, on Jan. $\frac{1}{4}$, 1882 for the first time after his succession to the throne, opened the Diet through his deputy the Governor-General.

„Representatives of the Grand Duchy of Finland.

Having summoned you, in accordance with the Law on the Diet, in order to discuss many important questions, I have been guided by the firm principle of following the example of my late, beloved, and ever remembered Father, who took continual care of the

which principle all their laws and institutions bear the impress“.

Our review of M. Ordin's work together with our description of the Union of Finland with the Russian Empire, have now come to a close.

M. Ordin lays down his pen with the intimation, to his readers, of having informed them of „the whole of the actual truth concerning the relations between Finland and Russia, such as history has created them“. The reader is, however, now able to judge for himself whether this product of M. Ordin's historical researches has much in common with truth and reality.



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